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Data Modelling & Bayesian Model Comparison
with Spherically Symmetric Priors
Riyaadh Jamodien MSc (Theoretical Physics) November 2020
Theanalysis of data is common inmany fields of science, andmodelling data is one of the standard
techniques in such analysis. Models are, of course, not unique and many theoretical models may
be constructed to describe the same set of data. When considering many competing models, we
naturally ask the question: which model best describes the data?
It is well known that the chi-squared criterion, which is commonly cited as a goodness-of-
fit between model and data, is inadequate as a measure of model quality. Rather, we employ
the Bayesian framework of probability theory in addressing the question of model description
of data. Within the Bayesian framework, the evidence (marginal likelihood) is the criterion by
which to compare competing theoretical models. The evidence is an integral (over all parameter
space) of the likelihood and prior. However, even for the simple case of linear models, there is
no consensus or clarity on the choice of the best uninformative prior which enables the unbiased
comparison of models with different numbers of parameters. In addressing the concern of the
prior, we consider the framework of spherical symmetry, in which the evidence is reduced from
an integral over a multi-dimensional space to that of a one-dimensional space, effectively reduc-
ing the problem to finding a single, optimal radial prior. We generalise existing results to a family
of priors via scale relations in the form of a scaling parameter, of which several scaling relations
are tested to find the best scale between models of different dimensions. We also introduce a
new hyper-parameter, which had previously been conflated with model dimensions. With these
developments we establish a prior that is sensitive to the new hyper-parameter, while insensitive
to the model dimension, leading to the establishment of information criteria that are sensitive to
these new parameters as well as the model dimension. These criteria are tested and shown to be
an improvement over the existing body of work. These information criteria perform on par with




Data Modellering & Bayesiaanse Model Vergelyking
met Sferies-simmetriese Voorafwaarskynlikhede
Riyaadh Jamodien MSc (Teoretiese Fisika) November 2020
Die analise van data is algemeen in verskeie wetenskaplike velde en een van die standaard teg-
nieke behels data modellering. Data modelle, is natuurlik nie uniek nie, en verskeie teoretiese
modelle kan geskep word om dieselfde data versameling te beskryf. Wanneer verskeie modelle
wat meeding in ag geneem word, ontstaan dié vraag: watter model gee die beste beskrywing van
die data?
Dit is bekend dat die chi-kwadraat kriterion, wat algemeen in die konteks van pasgehalte
tussen model en data gebruik word, onvoldoende as ’n maatstaaf van modelgehalte is. Ons maak
gebruik van die raamwerk van Bayesiaanse waarskynlikheid om die vraag vanmodelbeskrywing
van data te beantwoord. Met betrekking tot die Bayesiaanse raamwerk is die randaanneemlikheid
die maatstaaf waarmee kompeterende modelle vergelyk kan word. Die randaanneemlikheid is
’n integraal (oor die gehele parameter-ruimte) van die aanneemlikheids-waarskynlikheid en die
voorafwaarskynlikheid. Selfs vir die eenvoudige geval van lineêre modelle is daar egter geen
ooreenstemming of duidelikheid oor die keuse van die beste oningewyde voorafwaarskynlikheid
wat onbevooroordeelde vergelykings tussen modelle van verskillende dimensies toelaat nie. Om
die saak van die voorafwaarskynlikheid aan te spreek, beskou ons die raamwerk van sferiese
simmetrie, waarin die randaanneemlikheid vanaf ’n multi-dimensionele ruimte na ’n eendimen-
sionele ruimte vereenvoudig word. Sodoende vereenvoudig ook die probleem tot die soektog
na die enkele, optimale radiale voorafwaarskynlikheid. Ons veralgemeen die bestaande weer-
gawes na dié van ’n familie van voorafwaarskynlikhede met skaalverhoudings in die vorm van
’n skaalparameter. Verskeie skaalverhoudings word getoets om die beste verhouding tussen
modelle van verskillende dimensies te bepaal. Ons stel ook ’n nuwe hiperparameter voor wat
voorheen met die algemene model dimensie verwar is. Met hierdie veralgemenings skep ons ’n
voorafwaarskynlikheid wat die nuwe hiperparameter in ag neem, maar terselfdertyd die model
dimensie verontagsaam, waaruit ons inligtingskriteria bepaal wat hierdie nuwe parameters in ag
neem asook die model dimensie. Hierdie kriteria word teen die bestaande raamwerk van sferiese
simmetrie getoets, en in vergelyking is dit aangetoon dat daar verbeteringe is. Dit is aange-
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The presented content forms part of an ongoing body of work with unknown scope and range.
Countless hours have been spent in an effort to answer some questions (whether crucial or trivial)
in hopes to provide clarity and foundation to the content. It was always considered important to
ask how and why something is the way it is, rather than to accept it as such, even if it may have
been well-known.
Following this line of thought, an emphasis was placed on trying to achieve an intuitive under-
standing of certain principles that arose during the course of this work, leading it to be seemingly
narrow in range. Despite this range (or lack thereof), the aimed emphasis leftmany known routes
available for future endeavours, therefore it should be seen as fortuitous rather than lamentable.
The content is presented in a basic manner, in hopes of producing an accessible text. This resulted
in material that may be quite verbose on occasion, but it is in hopes of aiding in conceptual
understanding of the content.
Readers who are familiar with the basic principles of calculus and linear algebra should feel
comfortable with the presented content, however, the text is designed so that readers without a
strong mathematical background may still be able to follow the narrative.
With all things considered, the presented content ultimately serves as an introductory text and
not as a reference text.
∗ ∗ ∗
The journey contained within this text is not one of merely achieving a qualification; it is one
in the pursuit of knowledge, the acquisition of experience, the exploration of thought… it is an





At the start of a chapter or section, a list of identities may be provided if necessary. For example,
suppose we are to use Euler’s identity, then it would be listed as
Identities
reiθ = r(cos θ + i sin θ)
When an identity is used, instructive pink highlights are applied as an indication,














Of course, a list may often contain more than one identity, and so a specific identity will be
referenced when used, and where necessary. This makes the primary content less cumbersome
while also providing greater clarity without unnecessary explanations.
Discrete Mathematics
The content presented mostly follows the convention as set out by Graham et al. (1989). As such,
we take note of the following, since it may not be considered a standard convention (in many
circles of academia). The choices, however, were not made based on accepted convention, but
based on clarity of understanding and ease of reading.
Rising & Falling Powers
Rising and falling powers (also known as rising/falling factorials) of any number, z, are respec-
tively defined as,





zk := z(z − 1)(z − 2) · · · (z − k + 2)(z − k + 1)
=
Γ(z + 1)
Γ(z − k + 1)
,
where z, k ∈ C. Rising powers were historically written as Pochhammer symbols, zk = (z)k.
Hypergeometric Functions
Hypergeometric functions, also known as hypergeometric series, form a large class of functions
which include the exponential function, all the Bessel functions, and many others. For historical
xi
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reasons, there exists a plethora of different notations and conventions in common use. Consider
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∣∣∣∣ z) = F(a, b, 11








Our preferred notation is introduced on the left, equated to that of Graham et al. (1989), and
lastly to that of other texts which cover the subject. Unlike Graham et al. (1989), we utilise the
traditional subscripts of the hypergeometric functions since these summarise the type of function
we are dealing with at a mere glance.
Our notation also establishes a position sensitive parameter on the left of the vertical bar. The
position implies that parameters appear in the numerator when elevated and in the denominator
when lowered (as illustrated).
The notation is read as “zero-F -one”, “two-F -one”, or in general “p-F -q”. Certain prominent
hypergeometric functions, which contain paremeters in both the numerator and denominator of
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In general, each term in the series consists of ratios of rising powers of coefficients a, b, c, . . .,
while the real argument z is taken to the ordinary power. The subscripts ofF indicate the number
of coefficients appearing in the numerator and denominator respectively.





∣∣∣∣ z) = ez.
In truth, the exponential is a 0F0 function, and to maintain the hypergeometric notation, define
it with similarity to Graham et al. (1989).
Our notation is further extended when dealing with bivariate hypergeometric functions, as




∣∣ z), 1F0( a ∣∣ z), or simply 2F1(a, b; c; z) when unambiguous. This maintains
succinctness, while also maintaining typographic consistency.
Appendix B, TheTheory of Hypergeometric Functions (page 89) provides a brief introduction to







The progression of this text follows the title: (i.) Data modelling (ii.) & Bayesian Model Com-
parison (iii.) with Spherically Symmetric Priors.
model /'mɒd(ɘ)l/
n. a simplified (often mathematical) description of a system etc., to assist calculations,
predictions, and understanding.
v. (modelled, modelling) tr. devise a (usually mathematical) model of (a phenomenon,
system, etc.).
First we explore concepts regarding data and data modelling. When considering theoretical de-
scriptions of data there is a requirement of inference, and our principles of inference are intro-
duced with the Bayesian theory of probability. Inference would naturally depend on the model
and what it aims to model from the data.
When modelling data, we postulate theoretical candidate functions (candidate models) which
model any given set of data. As such, we always havemany competing candidate models and we
are interested in finding the model which best describes the data. In a simple sense, competing
models can differ by their number of parameters, the type of functions, etc. Of course, the prob-
lem then becomes how the best model of many competing models is chosen. Chapters 2 and 3
provide the necessary foundations in inference, data, and data modelling.
comparison /kɘm'pærɪs(ɘ)n/
n. The act or instance of comparing.
· bear comparison (often foll. by with) be able to be compared favourably.
Quantities such as the maximum likelihood estimate and the minimum chi-squared criterion are
often cited as quantifiers of the best model, however this approach is flawed. First in that it cannot
compare models of different complexity adequately (e.g. the comparison of models with differing
number of parameters, or of different function assignments, etc.). The chi-squared criterion will
always be lesser for a model of higher complexity, but this does not necessarily mean that the
model provides a better description of the data. Second in that the minimum chi-squared tends
to zero as a model’s complexity increases.
Therefore, when concerned with model comparison, models which are overly complex are not
adequately penalised in this setting.
Developments in information theory led to methods which succeed that of the chi-squared cri-
terion/maximum likelihood in the form of information criteria. In general, information criteria
incorporate the chi-squared criterion, but also include a penalty term, which sufficiently penalises
models of high complexity. Akaike (1974) and Schwarz (1978) used Bayesian arguments together
with Gaussian likelihoods to argue for the merits of their respective information criteria, namely
Akaike’s information criterion and the Bayesian information criterion. Within this context, the
minimum information criterion refers to the best model.
In Bayesian inference, the evidence incorporates not only the likelihood (of the model), but




an integral over the likelihood and prior. The evidence for any model has to normalise to unity,
therefore a penalty is imposed on models with a greater span in parameter space. This means
that the evidence naturally penalises complexity. Within this context the maximum evidence or
the minimum negative-log evidence refers to the best model.
Chapter 4 details the pitfalls of the chi-squared criterion, and addresses model comparison in
the context of both information criteria and the evidence.
spherical /'sferɪk(ɘ)l/
adj. (a) of or relating to the properties of spheres (spherical geometry).
(b) formed inside or on the surface of a sphere.
symmetry /'sɪmɪtrɪ/
n. (pl. -ies) a structure that allows an object to be divided into parts of an equal shape
and size, and similar position relative to the point or line or plane of division.
With the evidence often being non-trivial to compute (e.g. a high dimensional integral), Zellner
(1986) formulated a g-prior in an attempt to provide a prior which led to a simple analytical
formula for the evidence. Unfortunately, certain choices of the parameter g biases the model
comparison towards either complex or simple models, irrespective of the data, thus making it
unsuitable for model comparison.
In order to overcome this shortcoming, Liang et al. (2007) proposed a mixture model which
made the g parameter a variable, thereby avoiding the inconsistencies of Zellner’s original g-
prior. Liang’s hyper-g prior gave better results than its predecessor and it has gained traction,
however its conceptual basis remains unclear.
De Kock and Eggers (2017a,b) attempted to provide a better conceptual foundation for the g-
prior, the hyper-g prior, as well as other priors by identifying the underlying concept of spherical
symmetry. Within the framework of spherical symmetry, all of these priors were shown to be
special cases that are part of the general idea of r-priors.
Like its predecessors, r-priors maintained analytic results for the evidence, and further demon-
strated that spherical symmetry enables the evidence to be reduced from a high dimensional in-
tegral in parameter space, to a one dimensional integral in spherically symmetric space (along
the radius). Chapter 5 details r-priors and the framework of spherical symmetry.
Aim
Within the framework of spherical symmetry there are conceptual inconsistencies that are yet to
be resolved. These inconsistencies include the radius introduced with the r-prior and it’s relation
between models, the possibility of a scale between this radius and that of models in spherical
space (where models have their own respective radii), the nature of how a radius could span
the entire model space (from the minimal to the maximal model), and its effect on the evidence,
potential for scales between fixed model parametrisations, and the like.
With these inconsistencies being identified, this text’s primary investigation aims to resolve
them and extend (or ammend) the existing body of spherical symmetry. These advances are





This chapter serves as an extension to the introduction, providing a brief scope of the prelim-
inaries that are within this text. Everything that is set out here shall be considered in detail
later.
1.1 Data with Experimental Uncertainties
We begin with an explanation of what we mean by the word data within our context. The basic
situation is shown by example in figure 1.1. A scientist in some field, such as physics, psychology,
economics or one of many others, has made N sets of repeated measurements as a function of
an independent variable x.
The N = 6 measurement points, x = (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6), are fixed and known exactly;
they could be real numbers or bin midpoints. There is no need for equal spacing or even ordering
in the sense that x3 has to lie to the right of x2 and to the left of x4, although that is often the
x
y




case. Associated with each measurement point xn,
there is a data point yn, represented as a black dot
in figure 1.1. Each yn is itself the result of an ear-
lier process of deliberation andmeasurement. Typ-
ically, yn is an average over a number of underlying
measurements, all taken at xn, while the so-called
statistical error , sn, is calculated as the square root
of the sum of squared variations of these underly-
ing measurements. In data language, yn would be
the sample mean and s2n would be the sample vari-
ance of the underlying measurements. The details of calculating yn and sn do not matter for
the time being; what matters is that both yn and sn are fully determined by the measurements
performed by the scientist — without theoretical modelling or interpretation.
To the statistical error sn, the scientist will often add a systematic error reflecting his or her
best judgement of possible underlying measurement bias or other experimental sources of error
or uncertainty. The resulting experimental uncertainty, σn, is typically the square root of a sum
of statistical and systematic errors,
σ2n = s
2
n + (systematic error)2
or some other combination of sn and the systematic error. These experimental uncertainties σn
are shown in figure 1.1 as vertical bars above and below each data point yn, so that the total bar
gives a visual indication of the uncertainty around yn.
At the point where our analysis starts, both the set of measurements y consisting of all the yn





1.2 Descriptions of Data in Brief
Given data, D = (y,σ) = {yn, σn}Nn=1 and the known measurement points x, the goal is to
describe this data as accurately, but also as economically as possible. In this context, to describe
means to find some curve which we call the trial function or candidate function/model, such that
difference between the data yn and the candidate function at that point is minimal. Minimal in
the sense that the sum of the squared differences between all data points and the curve at the















We represent the candidate function with the notation y(x), noting that it is a function of x.
The σ2n in the denominator of equation (1.1) ensure that those data points yn which have a small
experimental uncertainty are weighted more heavily than those which do not. We include a
prefactor 1N in the definition of the squared difference Q so that it converges to a constant for
large N .
The most basic of tasks, known as least squares in the literature, is often applied to find some




is minimised. This is, of course, as simple as much as we could
hope for: simply try out all sorts of y(x) and choose that one which minimises Q best, then call
it the best-fit solution. Unfortunately, that is easier said than done.
Firstly, the candidate functions could have any number and combination of functional forms such
as polynomials, exponentials, trigonometric and all sorts of special mathematical functions, soQ
and its partial derivatives could easily become quite complicated. The choice of form is entirely
up to the scientist. Minimisation in this primitive form would involve infinitely many choices of
y(x) with blind calculation of infinitely many values of Q.
Secondly, even for a given form of the candidate function, there is great variability due to
different values of the underlying parameters α = (α1, α2, . . . , αK) entering into that function,
which from now on we denote as y(x |α). By convention, all quantities taken as known appear
to the right of the solid line | , the “solidus”, while those left of the solidus are the variables. A




















= 0 ∀ k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. (1.3)
Of course, this may turn out to be of exceptional technical difficulty, since the dependence of
Q on each parameter can be highly non-linear. It is also common to find strong correlations
between two or more parameters in the sense that they may vary together over a large range
with only a minimal change in the value of Q itself.
A technically simpler situation arises if the candidate functions, y(x |α), are restricted to be
linear in the parameters∗. The scientist in this case typically uses a set of “basis functions” fk(x)
∗ This does not mean that they are linear in x.
4
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1.3 From Least Squares to Probability Theory








n = 1, . . . , N k = 1, . . . ,K, (1.5)
which, together with the vector of standardised data






and on substituting equation (1.4) into equation (1.2) gives us a vector-matrix form as the inner
product of a row vector (z − Xα)T and a corresponding column vector,
Q(α,X,K, z) = 1N (z − Xα)
T
(z − Xα). (1.7)
Minimisation by means of equation (1.3) leads to the minimum-Q solution in terms of X, its
transpose XT and the data z, the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse,
α̂ = (XTX)−1XTz. (1.8)
1.3 From Least Squares to Probability Theory
The most serious problem with all the above methods is not technical but conceptual in nature.
On its own, least squares is an ad hoc principle, not a “law of nature” or any fundamental concept,
and it seems odd to base important judgements on the quality of physical interpretations
(
as
provided by y(x |α)
)
on an unjustified principle.
This is not an isolated case; we have seen that in spite of the wide use and large need of best-fit
solutions, the motivation for the methods used is often not well understood, and so different pro-
posals co-exist with different methods and different answers. For most scientists, such ambiguity
is undesirable.
A first step towards a solid foundation is to understand Q as being directly proportional to
the logarithm of a Gaussian probability. The joint probability for all N data points for y and z























































The proportionality p ∝ exp(−12NQ) means that
Q ∝ −2 log p, (1.12)
therefore castingQ as a log-probability implies that minimisation ofQ is equivalent to maximis-
ing p(z |α). Conceptually, least squares therefore amounts to the maximum likelihood.
1.4 Concepts in Model Comparison
1.4.1 Occam’s Razor & Information Criteria
A simple least squares approach has at least one other serious deficiency; minimisation of Q
for an unlimited choice of functions y(x) and arbitrarily many parameters α will almost always
yield a perfect solution (i.e. Q = 0), if y(x) is made complicated enough. For the linear candidate
functions of equation (1.4), a perfect solution is almost guaranteed if a sufficient number of terms
with free parameters α = (α1, . . . , αK) are admitted in equation (1.4).
Put differently, an almost arbitrary collection of N data points yn can be reproduced exactly
by using K = N free parameters αk, while for K > N there will be infinitely many perfect
solutions — a highly undesirable situation.
Clearly, the formulation is missing a key ingredient, namely economy of description, colloqui-
ally called Occam’s razor: the “simplicity” of a candidate function y(x) should count in its favour
compared to a more complicated one, even if the latter results in a smaller least squares solution
of Q (McElreath 2015, p. 165).
For linear cases, Occam’s razor demands that a trial function with a smaller number of pa-
rametersK should be able to compete with one with largerK , even if it does not fit as well. To
compensate for the decrease of the least squares sumQ(α,X,K, z) with increasingK , we need
an additional “penalty function” F which increases with K , so that the competition between
Q and F can lead to an overall minimum. This approach is commonly called the information
criterion approach.
There are many information criteria in the literature, they all follow the same scheme whereby
the criterion is a sum of the original Q, which decreases with K , and some specific penalty
function F which increases withK .
Two common information criteria, which this thesis will use as reference points, the first pro-
posed by Akaike (1974), known as Akaike’s information criterion (AIC)
AIC = NQ+ 2K (1.13)
and the second proposed by Schwarz (1978), known as the Schwarz information criterion, more
commonly known as the Bayesian information criterion (BIC),
BIC = NQ+K logN. (1.14)
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1.4.2 The Bayesian Evidence for Model Comparison
Themain insight is that, given the data at hand z,model comparison of two modelsM1,M2 can
be done by means of the probabilities for each model, p(M1 | z), p(M2 | z). By first considering
Bayes’ rule in terms of any modelMi, with i = 1, 2, . . .,




We then consider the comparison of twomodels by taking the ratio of the twomodel probabilities
as given by Bayes’ rule for each respective model, i.e. M1 and M2, which turns out to be the







where the evidence for model M1 can be found from an integral over the K1 parameters α =








and likewise for the evidence p(z |M2) which is a K2-fold integral over the K2 parameters of
M2. Maximising the evidence includes minimisation ofQ but also penalises models with larger
K , thereby providing a natural inclusion of Occam’s razor. characteristics of the evidence and
its associated quantities are detailed in chapter 4.
Both the AIC and BIC emerge as special cases of evidence calculations, as do maximum like-
lihood approaches, and of course all lower-order criteria such as least squares.
The evidence and its calculation is therefore crucial; if the underlying likelihood is non-linear in
the parametersα, theK-fold integral must be calculated numerically, which for largeK may be
quite challenging.
For linear models as in equation (1.4) entering the likelihood and some choices of prior, how-
ever, these integrals can be calculated analytically.
The problems identified so far have been solved conceptually on the most fundamental level
by the Bayesian viewpoint, including calculations thereof. However, the introduction of priors of
the type p(α |M) results in an additional concern. The main challenge is to construct a prior, in
mathematical form, which reflects our state of (available) knowledge on the one hand, but does




The Bayesian Theory of Probability
2.1 Introduction
Two friends, RiRi and JamJam, are visiting a nearby farm to collect fresh fruit from the trees on a
cool, cloudy morning. Upon blueberry and strawberry picking, they notice that the area around
the trees is fairly moist. RiRi looks down to notice sprinklers and concludes that the moisture is
a result of the sprinkers. JamJam pauses for a moment, then states that things aren’t that simple,
since there could be many possible reasons. She hypothesises that there may be a possibility
of it being due to morning dew, a morning drizzle, the sprinklers, or a number of any other
possibilities. RiRi asserts his argument as a certainty, while JamJam asserts that his argument is
only the most probable via her reasoning.
At first glance, RiRi may seem to have deduced the correct answer, while JamJam provided
reasonable counter arguments based on plausible possiblities — if, at any moment, it starts to
drizzle, then JamJam discounts RiRi’s argument even though he stated it as a certainty. The
primary difference between their means of reasoning is that RiRi reaches his conclusions based
upon statements and premises, while JamJam, on the contrary, reaches her conclusions based
upon weighing considerations of probable possibilities based on observations.
Notice that RiRi’s reasoning takes the cause (sprinkler) and reasons a consequence (moisture),
we may refer to this type of reasoning as deductive reasoning. JamJam’s reasoning, on the other
hand, takes a hypothesis or probable cause (dew, drizzle, sprinkler, etc.) following an observation
(moisture), which we refer to as inductive reasoning.
(i) Deductive reasoning (RiRi): black points represent
a cause and coloured points represent its con-
sequences.
(ii) Inductive reasoning (JamJam): coloured points
represent (observed) consequences while black
points represent their probable causes.
Figure 2.1: Visual comparison of deductive and inductive reasoning.
If we are to categorise the manner in which RiRi and JamJam reason, we are able to present
two models of reasoning — one involving certainties (RiRi: deductive) and another involving
inferences or uncertainties (JamJam: inductive).
Figure 2.1(ii) illustrates that inductive reasoning may be more involved than that of deduc-
tive reasoning, since any observation may have many probable causes, all of which need to be
weighed or considered against each other. Furthermore, several observations may have the same
probable causes and it is necessary to infer which probable cause provides the most reasonable
explanation of any given observation. While, on the other hand, the consequences of deductive
reasoning are (often) independent results stemming from an initial cause and are then reached
having followed a successive logical steps (no inferences or uncertainties).
Deductive reasoning is the type of reasoning used by mathematicians, where a mathematical
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proof is based upon a premise and proven either true or false. Inductive reasoning is the type
of reasoning used by scientists, who are often faced with some natural phenomena (potentially
represented by data) and aim to describe the underlying principle thereof (this is often referred
to as inverse or plausible reasoning).
Logic is an algebra founded on modelling systems of reasoning. In other words, a construction
which attempts to explain how we reason. As such, we may attempt to explain (or model) the
presented systems of reasoning, as was used by RiRi and JamJam, through a framework of logic.
2.2 Foundations of Bayesian Probability Theory
2.2.1 Logic of Propositions
Propositional logic is an algebra that studies logical expressions involving propositions and their
truths or falsities. For example, the state of any proposition x being true means that the propo-
sition not x is false. This form of propositional logic is known as classical propositional logic,
because it models propositions based on Boolean values: 1 ≡ true and 0 ≡ false.
Propositional logic introduces an algebra for logical expressionswith Boolean algebraic operands
as well as logical operators, such as AND, OR, and NOT. The operators operate on propositions (the
operands) with Boolean values (Aho and Ullman 1994, p. 642). As such, (classical) propositional
logic forms a Boolean algebra.
Example 2.1 A Computer Science Student’s Struggle
A student trying to understand the usage of conditional statements programmed the fol-
lowing in the Python programming language,
if
(
a > b or (a <= b and c < d)
)
:
This conditional was programmed to include three expressions which needed to be val-
idated, i. (a > b), ii. (a <= b) as well as iii. (c < d), with expressions ii and iii being
validated together.
They later realised that the above conditional may be replaced by the following one
which contains only two expressions, yet produces the same result,
if (a > b or c < d):
They reasoned that the first conditional succeeded if, in one case, the expression (a > b)
is true, and in the other case when (a <= b) and (c < d) are both true given that the
first expression is false. They also reasoned that (a <= b) is the negation (i.e. falsehood)
of the first expression (meaning that a ≤ b in this case), therefore if the statement of the
first expression fails, it implies that it is false, thus only the third expression is necessary,
yielding the second conditional which contains only two expressions (i and iii).
The expressions, which can be referred to as logical statements, presented within the conditionals
of example 2.1 are either true or false, provided their conditions are fulfilled (or not). Therefore
we can, for example, represent (a > b) by x, (a <= b) by NOT x and (c < d) by y — these
symbols (or combinations thereof) are generally known as propositional variables since they can
9
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represent any proposition (i.e. logical statement) which can be either true or false. These are
known as atomic operands of propositional logic.
As stated, propositional logic forms an algebra, and under the given operators containedwithin
this logic, may, for any propositional variables x and y, be defined as
• Negation: (NOT x) is true when x is false, and it is false otherwise.
• Conjunction: (x AND y) is true if both x and y are true, it is false otherwise.
• Disjunction: (x OR y) is true if either x or y or both are true, it is false otherwise.
Here we note that propositional variables, along with the Boolean values, represent what is
known as logical expressions. Logical expressions may be constructed through the binary op-
erators AND and OR as well as the unary operator NOT (Aho and Ullman 1994, p. 645).
In addition to these core operators, there are four additional logical operators,
• Implication: (x =⇒ y) means “if x then y” and is only false when x is false while y is
true.
• Equivalence: (x ≡ y) is true if and only if x and y are either both true or both false, it is
false otherwise.
• Negated Conjunction: (x NAND y) applies the AND operator followed by the NOT operator
to its operands.
• Negated Disjunction: (x NOR y) applies the OR operator followed by the NOT operator to
its operands.
The operators have precedence in the following descending order: NOT, NAND, NOR, AND, OR,=⇒,
and ≡. Precedence implies that operators have a logical order, for instance, consider that NOT x
≡ NOT y AND z would be grouped as (NOT x) ≡
(
(NOT y) AND z
)
(Aho and Ullman 1994, p. 652).
Truth tables may, naturally, be defined for all of these operators and while the study of truth
tables may be common in classical propositional logic, it provides little gain within the current
setting.
These operators (omitting joint operators) have symbolic representations defined as,
NOT x (2.1)
AND (x, y) (2.2)
OR (x+ y) (2.3)
The logical AND may often also be represented by xy, much akin to multiplication. The operator
NAND is symbolically known as
~w, while NOR is symbolically known as w.
Logical expressions involving propositions and operators have various possible results based
on the assignments of the Boolean values and for any expression, F , this collection of results
(stemming from an expression or expressions) is known as a Boolean function∗. Any Boolean
function can be represented by the core operators given by equations (2.1) to (2.3) (Aho and
Ullman 1994, p. 658).
∗ This is similar to the standard definition (in analysis) of a function, f , which maps x to y.
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The three core operators form a complete set, meaning that every Boolean function can be
represented through these three operators. Additionally, this means that the logical operators
which are not part of the core three (such as implication) may all be represented by the core three
operators. Wemay see this through the following representations of implication and equivalance.
Let the statement “if and only if” (symbolised by ⇐⇒ ) represent equality between two logical
expressions. Meaning one expression is true if and only if (!) the other is true.
Implication (x+ y) ⇐⇒ (x =⇒ y)
Equivalence
(
(x =⇒ y), (y =⇒ x)
)
⇐⇒ (x ≡ y)
Here we first defined the implication, afterwhich we used it to define equivalence. From this, it
is clear that all logical principles may follow merely from the core operators.
The NAND and NOR operators are both, individually, complete, because they can independently
represent the three core operators (Aho and Ullman 1994, p. 659). For example, for NAND, we
have that,
(NOT x) ≡ (x NAND 1) x ≡ (x
~w 1)
(x AND y) ≡
(






(x OR y) ≡
(





~w 1)~w (y~w 1))
2.2.1.1 Algebraic Rules for Propositional Logic
Within the Boolean algebraic structure, the operators obey the laws of the algebra and we may
expand our knowledge of logical expressions to encompass these laws.
Since the≡ operator is the operator with the lowest precedence, it is also the one fulfilling the
most algebraic properties. As such, we first consider the range of this operator before the others.
Law of Reflexivity x ≡ x
Law of Transitivity
(
(x ≡ y) AND (y ≡ z)
)
=⇒ (x ≡ z)
Law of Commutativity (x ≡ y) ≡ (y ≡ x)
Equivalence of Negations (x ≡ y) ≡ (x ≡ y)
The three core operators are analogous to the standard operators of arithmetic (−,+,×) (Aho













(x+ y) + z
) (2.4)
Law of Commutativity
(x, y) ≡ (y, x)














(x+ y), (x+ z)
) (2.6)
The commutative law asserts that the order of operation refers only to the order in which they
are stated and not the order in which events occur∗ Cox (1961, p. 5).
∗ In spoken language, on the contrary, stating x first and then y may have a different meaning than stating y then x.
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The distributive law of AND distributing over a proposition of OR states that either (x AND y) is
true or that (x AND z) is true. The distributive law of OR distributing over a proposition of AND
states that both (x OR y) and (x OR z) are true.
Note that the distributive law of AND distributing over OR is analogous to the distributive law
in arithmetic, while the distributive law of OR distributing over AND is neither analogous nor
equivalent to the distributive law of arithmetic.
Given that AND as well as OR are both associative, it implies successive propositions may be
grouped without internal ordering, we may therefore consider the natural extension of these
operators toK propositions. Thus, for any collection ofK propositions x1, x2, . . . , xK we have
a representation∗ for the disjunctions and conjunctions for collections of propositions,(































The centre expressions apply the operators to the collection of K propositions. In the case of
the AND expression between K propositions, the value of this expression will be true when all
propositions are true. In the case of the OR expression, the value will be false when all propo-
sitions are false and true otherwise (Aho and Ullman 1994, p. 651). This property is known as
consistency under extension toK propositions.
If in a collection of propositions at least one of many propositions is true, then the disjuntion
between them is true and spans the entire collection of propositions, then such a collection is
known as mutually exhaustive. If in a collection of propositions the conjunction between a
combination of any and all propositions is false, then such a collection is known as mutually
exclusive.
Here we introduced the symbolic shorthand notation for AND as well as OR for a collection of
propositions. Each are analogous to indexed notations from arithmetic, where the indexed AND
notation,
⊗
k, is analogous to the notation of products,
∏
k, and the indexed OR notation,
⊕
k, is
analogous to that of summations,
∑
k.
Furthermore, there are additional rules of note for both the operators AND as well as OR,
Identity
(x, 1) ≡ 1
(0 + x) ≡ x
(2.9)
Annihilation
(x, 0) ≡ 0
(1 + x) ≡ 1
(2.10)
Idempotence
(x, x) ≡ x
(x+ x) ≡ x
(2.11)
∗ To avoid ambiguity between a collection of propositions and a conjunction of a collection of propositions, note that
conjunctions are always contained in parentheses.
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Firstly, note that idempotence asserts (in both cases) that a proposition has been stated twice and
not that an event has occurred twice Cox (1961, p. 6). Secondly, note that subsumption may (in
both cases) be evaluated through the distributive law.
yx
(x+ y)
(i) Subsumption over conjunction (AND)
yx
(x, y)
(ii) Subsumption over disjunction (OR)
Figure 2.2: Venn diagrams illustrating subsumption





. In figure 2.2(ii) we have the disjunction between x and (x, y),




. In either case (over AND as well as
over OR) the illustrations establish the propositions and expressions, then perform the respective
operations between them, with the result receiving a green highlight (x in both cases).
Conceptually, we may think of subsumption as follows, suppose x ≡ “blueberries in a basket”
and y ≡ “strawberries in a basket”, the disjunction (OR) between these two propositions would
be to have two baskets with each, while the conjunction (AND) between these two would be to
have a small bowl and adding a little of both berries, but the bowl is only given upon request.
Now, subsumption as illustrated in figure 2.2(i)
(
over AND, given by equation (2.12)
)
requests
“only blueberries” between all of the options (two baskets in this case), thus the result is the
basket containing the blueberries (x). Similarly, subsumption as illustrated in figure 2.2(ii)
(
over
OR, given by equation (2.13)
)
requests “all blueberries”, but between the small bowl (which was
first requested) and the basket containing blueberries, but the blueberries are removed from the
bowl and added to the basket, hence the result is the original basket of blueberries (x).
There are two additional laws, within the structure of Boolean algebra, that allow for the expres-
sions of conjunctions and disjunctions to be expressed through the use of negations (Aho and
Ullman 1994, p. 677). These laws are known as De Morgan’s laws and relates an expression of a
negated conjunction to an expression of a disjunction and the expression of a negated disjunction
to an expression of a conjunction,
De Morgan’s First Law (x, y) ≡ (x+ y) (2.14)
De Morgan’s Second Law (x+ y) ≡ (x, y) (2.15)
De Morgan’s first law states that both x and y are false when at least one of them is false, and
the second law states that neither x nor y is true if, and only if, they are both false. Both laws
may be extended to a collection of K propositions without loss of generality.
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When observing De Morgan’s laws, note that if we exchange AND in the first law with OR,
we immediately recover the second law (and vice versa). Furthermore, observing the other laws
introduced, equivalences seem to appear in pairs, in which AND and OR are exchanged. Such
exchanges may be extended to propositions, such as between true and false, any proposition
becoming NOT of itself, etc. — but we see that the algebra remains logically consistent. This
phenomenon is known as the principle of duality, which in essence states that exchanging every
atomic operand by its dual (the counterpart within a pair), yields the dual result.
Lastly, we introduce the following,
(x+ x) ≡ 1 (2.16)
This is known as the law of excluded middle, and it states that either a proposition is true or its
negation is true — nothing inbetween∗. And similarly,
(x, x) ≡ 0 (2.17)
Is known as the law of non-contradiction and it states that two contradictory propositions cannot
be true at the same time. We can refer to the statement made by equation (2.16) as a truism; it
states a definite truth, and the statement made by equation (2.17) as a falsity; it states a definite
fallacy.








Which results from the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction, and it is essentially sub-
sumption over negation.
It is of interest to note that set theory also forms a Boolean algebra, therefore the principles of
propositional logic are analogous to that of set theory. When considering this analogy, proposi-
tions are equivalent to sets and the core operators of propositional logic can be mapped to those
of set theory as (NOT, AND, OR) 7→ (complement, intersection, union). In addition to this,
for any two propositions x and y, and any two sets X and Y , we may represent this mapping
symbolically as
(
x, (x, y), (x+ y)
)
7→ (Xc, X ∩ Y, X ∪ Y ).
2.2.2 Logic of Uncertainties
Propositional logic provides a framework of reasoning involving strict truths and falsities —
reasoning involving certainties. In other words, propositional logic characterises deductive rea-
soning. The natural extension to this framework would be to produce a framework of reasoning
involving uncertainties — one which characterises inductive reasoning. We consider proposi-
tional (i.e. classical) logic as the foundation to the development of a non-classical theory of logic
that is capable of reasoning within uncertainties.




2.2 Foundations of Bayesian Probability Theory
We are first required to motivate the necessities of reasoning under uncertainties; even though
the foundation of this reasoning consists of propositional logic, succeeding strict certainties nat-
urally implies that outcomes can no longer be restricted to that of only true and false, meaning
that Boolean values are no longer the only possibilities. Within propositional logic we were in-
terested in the evaluation of the state of a proposition x (as well as logical expressions thereof)
being either true or false.
Therefore, it is necessary to introduce the state of uncertainty in the proposition x, namely
ψ(x). The state of uncertainty in a proposition evaluates that proposition and provides an as-
sertion about how convincing (or plausible) it may be∗. The level of how convincing a state of
uncertainty may be is referred to as our conviction in the state of uncertainty in a proposition.
We shall refer to this construction of logic as uncertainty logic.
As such, we adapt the following desiderata†, provided by Jaynes (2003, p. 19), as the premise
of what is necessary to produce rational reasoning within uncertainties.
Definition 2.1 Jaynes’ Desiderata
I. States of uncertainty are represented by real numbers.
II. Qualitative correspondence with common sense.
i. If knowledge about the truth in a proposition increases, then the conviction
about its state of uncertainty increases.
ii. Small changes in knowledge of a proposition yields small changes in the con-
viction about its state of uncertainty.
III. Consistency within reasoning of propositional logic.
i. All possible ways to deduce a particular result should lead to the same result.
ii. All known propositions that can be taken into account should be taken into
account.
iii. Equivalent knowledge in states of propositions are represented by equivalent
convictions in states of uncertainties.
Having described the states of uncertainty in any propositions x and y as ψ(x) and ψ(y), we now
introduce the state of uncertainty in x provided knowledge on the proposition y: ψ(x | y). This
notation is read as “the state of uncertainty in x given y”. Conversely, if knowledge on the state
of uncertainty in proposition x is known, then the state of uncertainty in y given x is ψ(y |x).
Regarding any knowledge on propositions, as described in the desiderata, we note that it may
interchangeably be referred to as information and should always to be considered when evalu-
ating a state of uncertainty. We denote this as ψ(x | y, κ), where knowledge is represented by κ.
We have that all states of uncertainty are sensitive to one’s knowledge, and therefore we accept
knowledge to be implicit, ψ(x |κ) ≡ ψ(x), for any state of uncertainty.
This notation is known as the conditional‡, since the state of uncertainty in one proposition is
∗ Exactly how JamJam’s reasoning meant that the sprinkler may have been most reasonable, but given an instance
of rain, the rain became the more convincing reason for the presence of moisture. † Desideratum (pl. desiderata)
refers to something that is lacking but needed or desired. ‡ In spoken and computational languages the conditional
refers to if-then statements. These two conditionals should not be confused.
15
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
The Bayesian Theory of Probability
conditioned on the knowledge of another proposition. This notation provides us with a measure
of assessing our conviction in a state of uncertainty in one proposition provided knowledge of
another (known) proposition.
2.2.3 Axioms of Uncertainty Logic
An in depth, modern formalism for uncertainty logic is developed in Appendix A Foundations of
Bayesian Probability Theory (page 70), which establishes consistency between uncertainty logic
and probability theory.
Readers who are more interested in the usage of uncertainty logic, may proceed directly to the
following subsection with knowing that we may henceforth express our conviction in a state of
uncertainty in a proposition as the probability of that proposition: ψ(x) ≡ p(x), in other words
probability measures (or evaluates) our conviction.
2.2.4 Rules of Probability Theory
The consistency between uncertainty logic and probability theory means that we are now only to
review the rules of probability theory from the established framework of uncertainty logic. We
reiterate that all probabilities are always conditioned on one’s knowledge, κ, even if not explicitly
expressed.
The truism and falsity are defined as the definite probabilities,
p(x |x) = 1 (2.19)
p(x |x) = 0 (2.20)
Equation (2.19) establishes the scale (of magnitude) of normalised probabilities∗, with the truism
of propositional logic corresponding to the truism in probability, and equation (2.20) corresponds
to the falsity in propositional logic. Equation (2.20) is also the probabilistic equivalent to the law
of non-contradiction — there can be no assured probability of x when x is known to be true.
Following this reasoning, we express the total probability of this system as
1 = p(x |κ) + p(x |κ) (2.21)
Which is known as the sum rule. This rule is much alike to the disjuntion between a proposition
and its contradiction: x+ x ≡ 1.
Upon further exploration we now consider compound propositions with the operators AND as
well as OR (having just established NOT). The probability of a logical conjunction (AND) may be





= p(x | y, κ) p(y |κ) = p(y |x, κ) p(x |κ) (2.22)
This decomposition of the joint probability is known as the product rule. This rule originates
from our desiderata, which asserts that compound statements should decompose into simpler
∗ The preceding section affirm this scale to be arbitrary
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statements (in agreement with propositional logic). Note that there is no ordering within the
product rule, which is inherited from the commutativity of conjunctions of logical propositions.
If it so happens that knowledge on the state of proposition y has no influence on the state of
knowledge in proposition x (or vice versa), then the conditional in the probability p(x | y, κ) or
p(y |x, κ) loses meaning of that which it is conditioned on, meaning that the probability of x is
unaffected by any knowledge gained from knowing y (or vice versa). This is known as conditional
independence:
p(x | y, κ) CI= p(x |κ) (2.23)
As a result of conditional independence, the product rule reduces into a product of the individual
probabilities of the conjoined propositions. In other words, joint probabilities factorise into a





= p(x |κ) p(y |κ) (2.24)
This is known as logical independence. It is worth noting that logical independence is not a
property of an event or an object — the assertion of logical independence is based on our state
of knowledge.








= 1− p(x | y, κ) p(y |κ)




= p(y |κ)− p(x |κ) p(y |x, κ)
= p(y |κ)− p(x |κ)
(
1− p(y |x, κ)
)










This rule is also the probabilistic equivalent of the inclusion-exclusion principle.
If a collection of propositions is mutually exclusive (the conjunction between propositions is





= p(x |κ) + p(y |κ) (2.26)
Extending the product and generalised sum rules to a collection ofK propositions, x1, x2, . . . , xK ,





∣∣∣ κ) = p(x1 |x2, . . . , xK) p(x2 |x3 . . . , xK) · · · p(xK−1 |xK) p(xK |κ) (2.27)
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Here σj(K) represents all unique permutations of cardinality j from the set {1, 2, . . . ,K}. An
example hereof could be seen with σ3(4) =
{
{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}
}
, and these






so if k = 3, then ℓ performs the conjunction (x1, x3, x4).
For any collection of mutually exhaustive and exclusive propositions, y1, y2, . . . , yK , we have
p
(






= 0 , i 6= j
We may then partition the probability of proposition into this collection as a joint probability,
p(x |κ) = p
(










Summing or integrating over a parameter is known as marginalisation and the partitioning of
a probability of a proposition into the collection as a marginalised joint probability is known as
the marginal, and the marginalised quantity is known as the evidence.
We may thus state the idea of logical independence as a joint probability which factorises into
a product of its marginals (given a state of knowledge).




, we may express the conditional prob-
ability of a proposition as
p(x | y, κ) = p(y |x, κ) p(x |κ)
p(y |κ)
. (2.30)
Which is a generic form of Bayes’ rule. From here onward, we relax our notation for the proba-













Data & Data Modelling
3.1 The Relationship Between Data, Description & Simulation
It is very important to understand that there are three different aspects pertaining to data. While
the mathematics pertaining to each aspect may appear to be similar or even the same, the con-
cepts in each aspect are very distinct.
I. Physical Data and How it Originated
The concept of physical data was briefly introduced in section 1.1; we treat the topic more
thoroughly in section 3.2 below.
II. TheTheoretical Description of Existing data
Once data is available and it is believed to be true and interesting, science has a need to
describe it as well as possible. The description comes on four levels:
i. On the lowest level, the existing data is cast into a different form or summarised in
terms of purely data-derived quantities. No theoretical input into these quantities is
allowed or desired, although of course judgement and theory would motivate their
























which can be computed directly from the data without any theory.
ii. On the next level, the scientist uses their insight and inspiration to propose a model,
a theoretical description of the data. There are many different types of models. In
this text, we concentrate only on linear regression models for the likelihood (treated
at length in section 3.3) coupled to various priors which form the subject of later
sections and chapters, as well as the focus of this text.
Very importantly, Bayesianmodels consist not only of a choice of the usual probability
p(y |α,MK) for the data given the parameters i.e. the likelihood, but also of the prior
for those parameters, p(α |MK).
iii. On the third level, there are two or more competing models proposed for the same
data. The question is then which of these competing models provides the best de-
scription thereof (as detailed in chapter 4).
iv. On the fourth and highest level, the goal is to find and implement a systematic set
of criteria and methods to design and compare different model comparison methods.
In other words, there is a need to not only mechanically apply a particular method,
but also to see why and how this method works relative to another method, and then
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to use this insight to construct a best method which can be expected to work for as
many data sets as possible.
The background for best-method tests is not treated at length within this, since we
apply this evaluation through the mean squared error (see chapter 6).
III. The Numerical Simulation of Artificial Data
The third and final aspect regarding data is to test the different theoretical descriptions of
not only for one specific experiment’s data, but for many different data sets. While these
may in some cases be available from experiments, it is often necessary to generate such
data sets by means of computer based simulations. Simulations can be used as inputs into
testing the above third and fourth level of theoretical description.
Our particular implementation is covered in chapter 6.
3.2 Physical Data
3.2.1 Data Within Context
There is a huge variety of physical situations, an equally large variety of experiments and mea-
suring techniques, and a large variety in time and money available for gathering data. Section 3.1
covers them all, but only generically∗.
We specialise only to such data as previously illustrated, namely,
D := (y,σ) = {yn, σn}Nn=1, (3.1)
with data points y and experimental uncertaintiesσ. Also we only look at models using Gaussian
likelihoods, and we only consider candidate functions which are linear in the parameters.
We also consider only the case when the σ are fixed and known, rather than unknown.
x
y








(i) The basic data: xn, yn, σn
x
z
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
(ii) Uncertainty-rescaled data zn = yn/σn
Figure 3.1: Unrescaled and rescaled data
Figure 3.1 qualitatively illustrates some basic features of the type of data which we consider.
On the horizontal axis, we have N points at which measurements or observations were made,
x = {xn}Nn=1. In this example, the five measurement points are equally spaced and consecutive,
but that is not a general requirement. These measurement points are taken as fixed and known




throughout the analysis. They are therefore not explicitly included in notation, but considered
as part of our state of knowledge∗.
The five data points, y1, y2, . . . , y5, are shown as black dots and depending on the circum-
stances, they can be measured directly or they are the result of processing some “raw data”. For
example, there may have been 25 measurements η1, . . . , η25 made at the point x2, and the final
data point is the sample mean y2 = 125
∑25
i=1 ηi.
The experimental uncertainties, σ1, . . . , σ5 are shown in as blue bars above and below the re-
spective data points yn. We show for the measurement point x1 the values of the bottom and
top as y1−σ1 as well as y1+σ1.
The intention of the experimental uncertainties is to give the reader an indication of the degree
of confidence which the experimentalist has in the value of the measured yn: small σn indicates
an accurate and precise yn, while a large σn indicates that the value of yn is not well determined.
The determination of experimental uncertainties is a difficult and complicated topic, because
it is supposed to give information not only on statistical fluctuations, but also on systematic
uncertainties or systematic errors. Systematic errors or uncertainties arise from many causes,
including apparatus bias, calibration, human error and the like. Statistical fluctuations arise be-
cause some underlying variable is not controlled or there is a random physical influence such as
thermal noise.
We assume that both statistical and systematic errors have been taken into account in compil-
ing the experimental uncertainties†.
Figure 3.1(ii) illustrates what happens when the data yn is converted into “uncertainty-rescaled
data” by means of zn = ynσn : those points yn with small σn become larger and vice versa. It is, in
fact, possible to do the entire analysis in terms of z instead of (y,σ) (as seen in section 3.4).
∗ ∗ ∗
Example 3.1 Systematic and Statistical Errors: The Ten Metre Measure
In the hard labour industry, when labourers need to make a quick measurement while
they do not have their equipment on hand, they make use of clever innovations. For
example, they measure 10 metres by walking 13 paces. Given this practice, suppose we
know that the following rule or “law” applies:
10 metres have the same length as 13 steps.
In practice, we ask people at random to take 13 steps in a straight line from a defined
starting point. We measure the length of the 13 steps for each person and compare these
measurements to 10 metres. Not surprisingly, different people produce varying lengths
with 13 steps.
In order to account for this variation, we are required to pinpoint some source thereof.
It could be the result of several variables, but we may be able to eliminate the evidently
false ones, like the brand of shoes having any remarkable influence. Alternatively, we
∗ The choice of xn is of course important, since this is the subject matter of the field of experimental design which
tries to optimise the design matrix introduced in section 3.3. † The experimentalist ensures that these numbers
properly reflect the state of uncertainty.
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may consider a more relevant influence, such as the height of the individual: taller people
take longer steps while shorter people take shorter ones.
With this in mind, we see the systematic source of the variation, i.e. the systematic
error, primarily as the result of an individual’s natural stride length.
0m 10m
Figure 3.2: Footstep variations indicating how 13 steps may either overestimate or underestimate
10m, depending on the length of steps.
Naturally, we expect varying strides to produce varying lengths; longer strides are ex-
pected to exceed the 10/13 rule while shorter strides are expected to fall systematically

























Ideal Long stride Short stride
(i) Systematic error: tall and short individuals’
stride lengths.



























Gaussian fit Short stride Long stride
(ii) Statistical error on top of systematic error.
Figure 3.3: Systematic and statistical error
present within the experiment.
short of it. Figure 3.3(i) illustrates results ob-
tained from the first two participants. Evi-
dently, the person with the longer stride over-
shot the 10/13 rule, shown as the straight line,
while the person with the shorter stride “fell
short”.
In addition to the non-random “stride
length” represented by systematic error, every
individual person’s steps would vary if the ex-
periment was to be repeated. These variations
are however random and will tend to be sym-
metric about some mean.
This is illustrated in figure 3.3(ii), where
both the long strided and the short strided par-
ticipants took 13 steps many times and the fi-
nal distance for each trial over all repetitions
was recorded and then histogrammed. This il-
lustrates the statistical error. Figure 3.3(ii) also
reflects the fact that such histograms often take
the shape of Gaussian (normal) distributions,
which may be fitted with suitable Gaussians
functions.
3.2.2 Data From Additive Systematic Error & Random Variables
As previously stated, quantifying the experimental uncertainties, σ, of the data is not a primary
concern; these are taken as given. Nevertheless, it is tempting to make a priori physical models
which “explain” how the data which we finally observe came about.




nomenon being investigated follows and it is this rule that we consider as underlying the data.
x
y
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
(i) The underlying law or rule
x
y











Figure 3.4: Additive generation of data
Figure 3.4(i), this law is represented by the orange
curve which we could call the “true” y(x) — but
remembering that it is not possible to call any ex-
planation “true”. In the trivial case where the law
translates directly into data, we would have ob-
tained the five readings shown as red circles on top
of the curve, i.e. y(xn), n = 1, . . . , 5.
In this “explanation”, these “true” readings are
systematically distorted by numbers an, one at
each xn: as illustrated in figure 3.4(ii), with the
(now translated) blue circles. The changes an from
red to blue circles would always be the same if we were to repeat the experiment under the same
conditions.
On top of these systematic changes, there is an additional random variation ρn which would
be different for every repetition. This random physical variation often occurs in experimental
situations; one example is “thermal noise”. The ρn would therefore change for every repetition
of the experiment; this is indicated schematically by the red arrows in figure 3.4(iii).
Within the context of this additive physical “explanation”, the final data is the result of adding
the effects of the law, the systematic distortion and the random variation,
yn = y(xn) + an + ρn (3.2)
We note again that this “explanation” may be plausible and convenient, but in real experimental
situations may not be true. Nevertheless, this physical picture of a true y(x) changed by system-
atic distortions and random additional component, provides a convenient starting point for the
numerical simulation of data.
3.3 Linear Regression
Having dealt with data and its origins, we now turn to the theoretical description, and with
regards to our current state of knowledge, we have previously encountered the four levels of the
theoretical description of data.
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In this section, we make a start in constructing a model, or rather a class of models often called
linear regression.
The formulae derived below are standard textbook cases, with the important difference that
they form only a part of the picture in a Bayesian context. At present, we are dealing with only
the likelihood. A completemodel specification can only followmuch later once the various priors
have been introduced.
The specific form of the likelihood used for linear regression is that of a multivariate Gaussian.
The Gaussian comes about as follows, given data in the form D = (y,σ), the aim is to use
candidate functions (also called parametrisations), y(x), which are constructed from a suitable





Note that these are linear in the K free parameters α = {αk}Kk=1, not in x. Moreover, we refer
to the number of free parameters as the model order. Figure 3.5 illustrates two of the infinitely
many possible candidate functions which can be formed by varying the values of the parameters
x
y
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
Figure 3.5: Candidate functions attempting to
model the data. The true function, repre-
sented by the dashed line, is unknown.
The underlying law or true function shown in
dashed lines is, of course, unknown within the
analysis of data. Ideally, it would be the best case
scenario to find the candidate function y(x) which
approaches that unknown function as closely as
possible, but that aim cannot be achieved directly.
All that we have is the data, which as discussed
deviates from the underlying law in a way which
we cannot reconstruct. The true law cannot be
known, even in principle, because the given data
could have originated frommore than one possible
true law.
Note also that each data point yn contains information which pertains only to the candidate
and true functions at the point xn; it tells us nothing about the true law y(x) and note that
the candidate functions y(x |α) of equation (3.3) at any other x 6= xn. For any inference, we





fk(xn)αk ∀ xn ∈ x. (3.4)
This agrees with the least squares prescription, namely to minimise the differences between the
given data yn and the candidate functions only at the points xn,
Given particular values of r, there are therefore exactly N differences between data and can-
didate function,






















where ε = {εn}Nn=1. This quantity is often called χ2 or chi-squared criterion in the literature.
As explained before, the minimisation of Q can be understood as the maximisation of the
likelihood if we argue that the distribution of differences between data and the trial function at










n = 1, . . . , N, (3.7)
and that, for independent εn, the likelihood for all the differences ε1, . . . , εN is therefore the
product∗














With the help of equation (3.5) this is easily transformed into a likelihood for the data y
















This can be cast in terms of vectors and matrices. Let ε = y − y, and define the N×K design
matrix V with matrix elements Vnk := fk(xn), so that equation (3.3) becomes y = Vα. Also let
Σ be the N×N diagonal matrix with matrix elements Σnm = σnσm, i.e. σ2n on the diagonal†.
then the chi-squared criterion can be written as
Q(y) = 1N (y − Vα)
T
Σ−1(y − Vα) (3.10)















There are now certain aspects which are worthy of note,
1. The Gaussian in Equation (3.7) and the resulting Gaussian forms for the likelihood are a
model choice and not at all compulsory; one could choose many other functions for the
likelihood. The choice of Gaussian has, of course, substantial advantages: firstly it results
in the convenient and beautiful linear algebra theory set out in this chapter and thousands
of other books and papers. More fundamentally, the central limit theorem implies thatmost
non-Gaussian probabilities eventually converge to a Gaussian under convolution. There
are, however, data cases and types which are best described in terms of other functional
forms.
∗ We could write this probability as p(ε |σ), but since σ here and its generalisationΣ remains constant throughout,
we omit it from the notation. † This general form may be reduced to the previous form by considering the matrix
elements to be such thatΣnm = σnσmδnm.
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A deeper explanation of this is that knowledge of some data only in the form of the data
mean and data variance, without additional information, leads to a Gaussian likelihood by
maximisation of entropy, without any claim or need that the underlying data must follow
a Gaussian (Jaynes 2003, pp. 208–210).
2. The definition of εn as the difference between the data yn and the candidate function at
that point y(xn |α) resembles the variable ρn = yn − y(xn) − an of equation (3.2), and
consequently the sum y(xn) + an (true function plus systematic changes an) is also often
confused with the candidate model y(xn |α). However, εn and ρn are conceptually far
apart: ρn is a random variable designed to mimick the randomness of measurement in
experimental situations, while εn is a variable within model building.
3. As already stated in section 3.1, a third kind of Gaussian with a third set of random vari-
ables is introduced in the course of data simulation. While one of these may be used to
motivate another, there is no principle or theorem which requires the physical data, the
model building and the data simulation to have the same mathematical structure.
4. It is of interest to note that the candidate model takes on the role of the mean in the Gaus-
sian, thus, when finding the optimum candidate model, we are optimising with respect to
the mean.
3.4 Minimum Chi-squared & Maximum Likelihood
As already outlined in the introduction, the derivation so far can be understood entirely within
the traditional least squares theory or alternatively that of the maximum likelihood, because
minimisation of Q is equivalent to maximisation of the likelhood through equation (3.11).
Given the analytical results, minimising the chi-squared criterion with respect to the K pa-
rameters ofα is a simple matter. We first consider the algebraic first and second derivatives, and
then quote without derivation the vector-matrix form of the same derivation.
To find the values of the parameters α̂ at whichQ is an extremum, the derivative with respect



















which results in the vector-matrix equation
0
!
= 2(VTΣ−1Vα̂− VTΣ−1y) (3.13)
so that the minimum-Q (maximum likelihood) parameter values are given by
α̂ = (VTΣ−1V)−1 VTΣ−1y (3.14)






= 2 (VTΣ−1V)ij (3.15)
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If consider the case in which no covariances are present, such as with Identically and Indepen-
dently Distributed (IID) data, and the covariance matrix reduces to the diagonal matrix of σ2n,












we thus obtain a rescaled design matrix, which we shall denote by X. The chi-squared criterion
then simplifies to
NQ(α) = χ2
= (z − Xα)T (z − Xα)
= (z − ζ)T (z − ζ). (3.18)
Here we define ζ := Xα as the vector representing the model, and the maximum-likelihood
parameter vector of equation (3.14) becomes the well-known Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse,
α̂ = (XTX)−1 XTz. (3.19)
In the general case, this result is valid also for non-IID covariance matricesΣ since it is positive
semi-definite and therefore its inverse has a Cholesky decomposition∗: Σ−1 = LTL and the
quantities derived in equations (3.14) and (3.15) may be defined in a fashion near identical to






which is identical to equation (3.19) on settingLV = X andLy = z. Given our assumptions and
from this pseudo-inverse we learn that we need only the data and the design matrix to determine
the most suitable candidate model. TheK×K matrix of the second derivatives in equation (3.15)













Noting that higher-order derivatives with respect to α are zero, and expanding Q in a Taylor
series about α̂ provides us with the following, quadratic form
Q(α) = Q(α̂) + (α− α̂)TH (α− α̂). (3.22)
The first term in the expansion is the minimum χ2 criterion, while the second term offers us
grounds for exploration.
By rescaling the data, the likelihood of equation (3.11) can be written in terms of the chi-








∗ The Cholesky decomposition is the decomposition of a Hermitian positive-definite matrix into the product of a
lower triangular matrix and its conjugate transpose.
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3.5 Geometric & Linear Algebraic Perspective
We shall now consider an alternative geometric approach to our current analysis, while still
bearing everything up to this point in mind. Suppose we represent the data as a vector, z in an
N -dimensional “data space”, and we desire to approximate this vector by defining any vector,
w, from the vector spaceW , the “model space”, which contains all possible candidate function
vectors, w ∈
(
ζ(x1|α), ζ(x2|α), . . . , ζ(xN |α)
)







Figure 3.6: Construction of vectors inW which
approximate the vector z.
model will be a subspace of the data space, and any
approximation will result in an error vector of the
form ε = z −w. Any possible candidate function
vector in W will result in a non-zero error vector,
unless z is itself contained in the vector space —
which implies that if the data contains unknowns,
then the error cannot be zero. It is then of interest
to know which w best approximates the response
vector z. Naturally, the best approximation would
be the one which has a minimum length in ε (i.e.
the shortest norm ‖ε‖), meaning that the lesser the distance, the better the approximation.
In addition, this also means that the distance between z and the vector space W is being
minimised — we want z to be as close toW as possible (Anton and Rorres 2005, p. 332). Among
all vectors inW , suppose there exists at least one vector, ŵ such that
‖z − ŵ‖ < ‖z −w‖
for all other vectors w in W . Then, we may explore this using the Pythagorean theorem and
linearity in the inner product,
‖z‖2 = ‖w‖2 + ‖ε‖2 + 2〈w, ε〉 (3.24)
From this we learn that the vector ŵ minimising this error vector is the one in which the inner
product between the cross terms is smallest, i.e. when these vectors are orthogonal. Therefore,
the vector in W which best approximates the response vector, is the orthogonal projection of z
ontoW ,
ŵ = projW z (3.25)
i.e. the best approximation to z is given by z−projW z. To find an expression for the orthogonal
projection for our purposes, we take a brief excursion into the equivalent additive noise model.
In general, when linear systems of equations of the form Ax = b, are indeterminate∗, then there
exists no exact solution to the system and a similar principle applies. In this system, A is an
N×K dimensional matrix, x is aK-dimensional vector, and b is an N -dimensional vector.
With indeterminate systems, the quantity ‖b− Ax‖ may (once again) be viewed as the error,
meaning that b is approximated, withx serving as the approximate solution. The vector spaceW
∗ An indeterminate system is one for which more than one solution exists.
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may be considered to be the column space ofA, for which the productAx is a linear combination
of the column vectors of A, for each vector x. This means that Ax varies over the entire column
spaceW (Anton and Rorres 2005, p. 333).
Minimising the error means that b is projected onto the column space, and the orthogonal
projection would yield the best approximation: x̂ = projW b, where ‖Ax̂− b‖ is a minimum.
Since the minimum error vector is perpendicular to the column space of A, it implies that the
quantity b − Ax̂ lies in the nullspace of AT (Anton and Rorres 2005, p. 334), and as a result of
othogonality it then follows,
AT(b− Ax̂) = 0
x̂ = (ATA)−1AT b (3.26)
The equations associated with this solution are known as normal equations and this solution is
known as the least squares solution. Moreover, we note that this is the same solution that we
obtained in equation (3.19). If the columns of A are linearly independent, then the linear system
has a unique least squares solution (Anton and Rorres 2005, p. 335). In this setting, the orthogonal
projection of b onW is given by,
projW b = Ax̂ = A(A
TA)−1AT b (3.27)
We may refer to the matrix P = A(ATA)−1AT as the projection matrix or simply the projector.
Translating this into our geometric analysis, we identify b = z, A = X and the projector as
P := X(XTX)−1XT (3.28)
in terms of which the minimum chi-squared criterion simplifies to
NQ(α̂) = z
T
z − zTPz (3.29)
Now we may collate our knowledge from the formalisms of linear regression and least squares,
and refine our view on modelling data. Firstly, we note that the N×K design matrix X must
always contain more observations than parameters. This upper limit exists, because if it so hap-
pens that K > N , then the system has infinitely many solutions for the linear system. Hence
we must have K ≤ N and there is an upper limit on the number of parameters. In all cases in
whichK < N , the system is indeterminate and the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE), which
is also the least squares solution, becomes the best approximation.
Secondly, the data (z), the noise (ε), and the model vector (ζ constructed from the candidate
functions) are all defined from their respective vector spaces, which we refer to as data space,
noise space, and model space. The space of α we refer to as parameter space.
We note that minimising the projection error and minimising χ2 (or NQ) is the same pro-
cedure and yields the same results. We conclude that the error may be expressed simply as χ
and the optimisation procedure of minimising χ2 is equivalent to minimising the least squares
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3.6 Transformation to a Symmetric Likelihood
The Hessian, as in equation (3.21), is positive semi-definite and symmetric, therefore it may be
diagonalised via eigen decomposition,
Huj = λjuj j = 1, . . . ,K. (3.30)
Since the Hessian is symmetric, it’s eigenvectors are orthogonal and we may always construct
an orthonormal basis therefrom, therefore we have thatuTiuj = δij , which implies that meaning
that S−1 = ST and det S = 1. Therefore H can be diagonalised by means of
H = S−1ΛS (3.31)
where Λ is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of H. The parameters in quadratic form thus
undergo a transformation,
Q(α) = Q(α̂) +
(
Λ
1/2 S (α− α̂)
)T(
Λ















Q(β) = Q(β̂) + (β − β̂)T (β − β̂) (3.35)
χ̂2 = NQ(β̂) = 〈z2〉 − β̂2 (3.36)
with β̂ = Λ1/2 Sα̂ and where we introduce shorthand notations













There is a geometric meaning behind the transformation from α to β and the effect may be
visualised through the likelihood. In Figure 3.7(iii), we show an example of the transformation
of a likelihood with two parameters, (α1, α2) → (β1, β2). Firstly, the orthonormal eigenvector


















Figure 3.7: Rotated and rescaled contour plots of the likelihood forK=2
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Secondly the square root of the eigenvalues rescale the parameters, resulting in a spherically
symmetric form for Q, with the sphere centered at (β̂1, β̂2), the MLEs of the transformed pa-
rameters. The example is trivially extended to K parameters: the transformed likelihood will
have contours which are spherically symmetric on theK-sphere (hypersphere inK dimensions)
with the centre of the K-sphere located at β̂. This symmetry reflects the rotation and rescaling
of the parameter space or, statistically speaking, the removal of covariances and rescaling of all
variances to one. A spherically symmetric Gaussian distribution has spherical contours of equal
probability centred on the point of maximum likelihood.
∗ ∗ ∗
Example 3.2 Sally’s Seashells
Sally said she sells seashells by the seashore. She usually collects the most beautiful
seashells after high tide. In order to assure herself about the ideal times to collect, she
conducted a small experiment: everyday, at the start of each hour, between 07:00 and
17:00, she measured the water level at the pier to determine how the tide varies.
After one month, she took the mean value of her readings for each time measured,
afterwhich she managed to produce the following data,
07:00 08:00 09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00
0.121 0.885 1.456 1.220 0.375 0.087 -0.726 -0.107 0.268 0.794 1.489



















Figure 3.8: Sally’s data after one month.
Given that there is no reference to a mid-
point between high tide and low tide, she
considered her first reading to be a point of
origin. Note that repeated measurements
and the subsequent averaging process ac-
counted for a band of variation. Her goal
is to now model this data, and under obser-
vation she notices that there is a visible os-
cillatory trend, as can be seen in figure 3.8 —
meaning that the “true law” may be oscilla-
tory. She decides to consider two possible
models: i. a polynomial model and ii. a sinusoidal model. With either of these models,
the primary assumption is that the data is modelled as a linear system, therefore the prin-
ciples of linear regression/least squares are applicable. Provided with this specification,
Sally denotes the polynomial model as v, while she denotes the sinusoidal model as w,
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Observe that the order of each model need not be the same; it is not necessary forK = L,
even though the same data is being modelled. Moreover, the sinusoidal model is defined
to be orthogonal, since this offers greater stability (among other things compared to a
standard sine representation). Naturally, Sally opts for a fourth order (i.e. cubic) polyno-
mial, while tuning the sine model (by eye).
The best parameters are determined via the pseudo-inverse given by equations (3.19)
and (3.26), and the candidate models consequently model the data as




















(i) Polynomial candidate model of orderK = 4.




















(ii) Sinusoidal candidate model of order L = 5.
Figure 3.9: Sally’s candidate models
Evidently, both candidate models capture the oscillatory behaviour of the data and pro-
vide a seemingly suitable description thereof, even though each model is of a different
order. Havingmodelled the data, Sally is now facedwith a new problem: which candidate
model is the best model?
Note that the fundamental assumptions are about the data (Gaussian noise, linear system, etc.)
and any knowledge about the underlying “true” law is drawn therefrom. While candidatemodels,
such as those in figure 3.9, may provide adequate descriptions and predictions of data, there is
no fundamental knowledge gained in knowing anything about this law.
Furthermore, various different models may provide equally accurate descriptions of data, but
we have two new concerns, firstly the model order — since higher model order may provide
better predictions∗, but this introduces the misconception that we are more interested in the data
than we are in the underlying phenomenon.
The second concern is model quality; we may provide many unique model descriptions, but
we are currently at a loss as to which model models the underlying phenomenon or “true” law
best.






Section 1.4.1 briefly described the necessity for economy when modelling data, since the least
squares method would always prefer the model with more parameters. Now we shall provide
insights into this issue on a more fundamental level, but first consider it informally.
The situation is that we have one particular data set D, with specific numbers, but that a rep-
etition of the same experiment under the same conditions would yield slightly different data on
every repetition. The best explanation even for our present data, D, must therefore be proba-
bilistic. The question is then: which probability density best explains the data?
There will almost always be more than one possible model which may describe the data ade-
quately, however, the question becomes how does one strike a balance between choosing a simple
model over a more complex model, one with more and one with fewer parameters? Furthermore,
how helpful will a simple and a more complex model be in predicting future data?
We now face the the first of the two raised concerns, in which the predictive power of a model
may increase with complexity. When do we prefer a model of orderK or another ofK+1which
provide similar predictions of data?
One answer to this question is, of course, tied to our state of knowledge. Preference of a more
complex model may imply knowledge of the context of the data beyond what is merely observed.
Therefore a preference of simplermodels (lower order) over complexmodels (higher order) which
make predictions of similar accuracy is rational to our reasoning.
As a matter of fact, Occam’s razor is often considered a guiding principle of this choice, stating
that complexity should not come without necessity (McElreath 2015, p. 165). This is commonly
rephrased as a simpler hypothesis may often be the more suitable hypothesis. Here complexity
does not imply anything more than what the simplest case provides, on the contrary, it seems as
though it is apparent that one’s state of knowledge would imply that one knows more than what
is merely observed here in order to justify cases such as those.
We may now approach the second of the two raised concerns, which regards predictive quality,
but recall that this is with relation to the unknown “true” law and not merely to the data. This
draws a fine line between what is known as overfitting and underfitting data. Overfitting is an
occurrence when the candidate model can reproduce the data with minimal or no discrepancy,
which may lead to poor prediction since the model acquired too much from the data, thus loses
predictive quality in relation to the law or underlying phenomenon which we aim to model.
Underfitting is an occurrence when the candidate model models the data with too little accuracy,
thus also losing predictive quality in relation to the the underlying phenomenon.
Figure 4.1 revisits Sally’s data (example 3.2) with an illustration of what it means to overfit
or underfit the data with respect to model order. The overfitted model introduces a model with

























(i) Underfitting data (L = 2)




















(ii) Overfitting data (L = 10)
Figure 4.1: Sally’s data revisited.
The question remains as to which model models the data best. Overfitting acquires too much
information specific to the current sample being modelled; simply stated, the model becomes
sensitive to the purely random fluctuations in the data over and above the desirable sensitivity
to the underlying law.
Put differently, A model which overfits a sample is sensitive to irrelevant components in the
data and may lead to worse predictions for any future data samples (McElreath 2015, p. 168).
When underfitting, on the other hand, the model acquires too little information from the data
at hand, is thereby insensitive to the details conveyed by that data, and will therefore also make
poor predictions (McElreath 2015, p. 173).
4.2 Bayesian Model Comparison in General
At this point, we are aware that the goal is to compare both general hypotheses as well as more
specific models which have different degrees of complexity. But how, exactly, does one find the
model which best represents the data?
The Bayesian answer to this question is simple but far-reaching. Recall that in equation (2.30),
the general form of Bayes’ rule, we had already seen that, for any logical propositions x, y and
for any background knowledge κwhatsoever, one can always express the probability for x given
y in terms of the inverse probability of y given x,
p(x | y) = p(y |x) p(x)
p(y)
. (4.1)
Noting that probabilities are always conditioned on κ (even if not explicit). Given some data D,
assume that there are exactlyM hypotheses or models M1,M2, . . . ,MM which we consider
as possible explanations. For any one model Mm let x be the proposition “Mm is true” and y
stand for “the data is D”. Then equation (4.1) provides an expression for the probability ofMm
being true given D,






4.3 Model Odds & Reference Models
Firstly, the model prior is the probability thatMm is true, given only our state of knowledge κ,
but no data. Like all priors, themodel priormust be assigned by us based on our knowledge, infor-
mation and judgement. By our own judgement, one of themmust be true so
∑
M
m=1 p(Mm) = 1.
If we have no a priori reason to prefer one model over another, we can set all the model priors
equal, p(Mm) = 1M for allm. If we do have pertinent reason to consider a particularMa more
credible than others, we could assign p(Ma) > 1M , so that freedom remains available if we need
it.
Secondly, themodel likelihood is considered to be our model of the data and provides a repre-
sentation of the data if the data were to be modelled according toMm.




p(D |Mµ) p(Mµ) (4.3)
so that the posterior becomes
p(Mm | D) =
p(D |Mm) p(Mm)∑
M
µ=1 p(D |Mµ) p(Mµ)
(4.4)
in other words, the probability of a model being correct can be calculated completely once the
evidence for all the models has been calculated.
4.3 Model Odds & Reference Models
While Equation (4.2) is correct and complete, there is a more convenient formulation in the form
of odds. Of theM evidences for modelsMm, withm = 1, . . . ,M , which have been calculated,
we choose one as the reference or base model. Consider this model to be Mb, then we may
determine the odds of all m = 1, . . . ,M model posteriors by using equation (4.2) with respect




















and so we can write the model posterior odds p(Mm | D)p(Mb | D) in terms of the Bayes factor and the prior
odds p(Mm)p(Mb) . Since we have no reason to prefer any of our models, the prior odds equals unity,
hence the model posterior odds is equal to the Bayes factor (evidence odds).
In our case, much of the work in calculating evidences can be done analytically. Taking ratios





Since Bayes factors can easily become very large or very small, it makes sense to find and
quote logarithms thereof. The procedure thus becomes that of choosing one reference model,
then to find a Bayes factor for every other model with respect toMb, and then to compare




The model with the largest E(m, b) is then the “best model”.
4.4 The Evidence as Occam’s Razor
As we have just seen, the evidence plays a central role in model comparison. Before discussing
it, we must clarify the use of the word evidence. Strictly speaking, we should call p(D |Mm) the
model likelihood in the context of section 4.2. We use the term evidence because it is appropriate
in the context of parameter inference, as detailed in section 4.7.
Returning to the main issue: the evidence is the probability forD for all possible values Ω(α)




dα p(D,α |Mm) =
∫
Ω(α)
dα p(D |α,Mm) p(α |Mm). (4.9)
We recognise p(D |α,Mm) as the likelihood of the data∗ which was the subject of chapter 3,
while p(α |Mm) is the parameter prior which will be treated in detail in the following chapter.
Finding the evidence therefore requires computation of the K-dimensional integral of equa-
tion (4.9). This raises the pitfall of cost of computing and accuracy of numerical results, since
every additional parameter requires an additional integral, and since K can easily range into
the hundreds or even millions, the numerical challenges become significant. For this reason,
analytical answers of the kind found within this text can be very valuable.
We now briefly explain in a qualitative way why computation of the evidence automatically
incorporates a penalty for largerK as already discussed in chapter 1 and section 4.1.† Consider
possible data
Evidence
Figure 4.2: Qualitative behaviour of the evi-
dences of MJ and MK as functions of
possible data.
two models, MJ and MK , with J and K param-
eters respectively, and with J < K . Each model
attempts to model possible data with evidences il-
lustrated in figure 4.2. With more parameters at its
disposal, MK can describe more kinds and more
complex data than MJ , so the (qualitative) blue
curve for MK ranges over a larger set of possible
data; in the figure, it is “wider” than the red curve
for MJ . Since both evidences must, of course, be
normalised to unity, the blue-curve evidence forMK must necessarily bemostly (but not always)
smaller than that of the red-curve evidence forMJ .
∗ Note that the likelihood merely attempts tomodel the data. The data is only ever processed and analysed, it is never
modified; tampering with the data is forbidden. Data is considered to be immutable! Strictly speaking, we should
invent a “data variable”D, and the likelihood would be written as p(D=D |α,Mm) † Consult Mackay (2003, §28)
for a longer, more complete discourse.
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4.5 The Ideal Prior
Once the actual data D is measured, it would appear as one particular point on the horizontal
axis of figure 4.2. If that actual data falls in the “central” area where the red curve exceeds the
blue one, the simpler modelMJ will therefore win. If, however,D falls somewhere on the left or
right tails, thenMK will win, but only relatively speaking, since the evidence forMJ andMK
will both be small.
Essentially, the normalisation requirement functions imposes a penalty on largerK and thereby
takes on the function of Occam’s razor.
4.5 The Ideal Prior
The evidence differs radically from traditional model comparison statistics in that it requires
the specification of a parameter prior. While this prior may cancel in specific situations (such
as ratios), in general the prior has direct influence on the evidence and therefore on the entire
model comparison chain.
For this reason, we aim to list the necessary criteria which priors should fulfil,
1. A prior p(α|K,M) should reflect the state of knowledge of the scientist as accurately as
possible, where such knowledge is available.
2. Where no such knowledge is available, the prior should be as impartial to all values of α
as possible, which is the same as saying that it should not represent overconfidence in a
particular answer or leave out possible answers.
Mathematically, the prior should be as uniform as possible over the set of all possible pa-
rameter values, Ω(α), but consistent with constraints and prior knowledge.
3. The prior should be as impartial or insensitive as possible regarding the number of param-
etersK , even while the evidence itself should be highly sensitive toK .
4. For the purposes ofmodel comparison, the prior should be proper, that is, its integral should
exist and be normalised, ∫
Ω(α)
dα p(α|K,M) = 1. (4.10)
Use of improper priors where this condition is not fulfilled is occasionally convenient, but
they are not allowed within the present context of evidence calculation.
5. The ideal prior should be versatile in the sense that it should work as well as possible over as
wide as wide a class of problems as possible, rather than doing very well in one particular
scenario and badly otherwise. That does not mean that such a best prior should always
provide the highest evidence for the correct model, but that it should do so on average over
many different experimental situations and data.
6. Naturally a choice of prior which together with Gaussian likelihoods leads to analytical
solutions of the evidence has big advantages over a prior needing numerical calculations,
because the solution’s behaviour can be studied in detail and applies to an arbitrary number




4.6 Model Comparison & Evidence Within Context
The results derived above are true in general. However, within our context, we set all the model
priors equal, p(Mm) = 1M for allm, and the data is given simply by the data vector z. A model
Mm is made up of a choice of likelihood p(z |α) and of a parameter prior p(α).
As a reminder: the likelihood is a model-dependent probability for the data, where calculation
of the probability presupposes knowledge of the values of the parameter values. The prior is our
assignment of the parameters within this model, prior to the acquisition of data. As is apparent
from equation (4.9), the evidence is the prior-weighted average of the likelihood over all possible
parameter, and provides a measure as to how a well the model represents the data.




as given by equation (3.23)
)
with or, once the quadratic form has been diagonalised to yield,




as given by equation (3.34)
)
.
Since the likelihood always takes on a Gaussian form, and the basis functions entering the
design matrix will always remain the same, for the purposes of model comparison we need only
keep track of the number of parameters, K , in the parameter vector which enter the candidate
function (or parametrisation) y(x) =
∑
K
k=1 fk(x)αk, henceK represents our measure of model
complexity.
For the parameter prior, there will be many variants and choices, which we will track by using
Hm in the conditional for various casesm. Hence the models of section 4.2 are denoted by us as
Mm −→ (K,Hm)
and the parameter prior will be written as p(β |Hm). We will treat the various priors Hm as
given throughout, so that in our language, the model posterior of equation (4.4) reads
p(K | z,Hm) =
p(z |K,Hm) p(K |Hm)∑Kmax
K=Kmin
p(z |K,HK) p(K |HK)
(4.11)
where p(z |K,Hm) is the evidence and p(K |Hm) the prior assignment to K within the prior
hypothesis of Hm. For log-Bayes-factor calculations, we select one reference model with Kb
parameters and find the log odds for all models between a minimum and maximumK-value,
E(K,Kb |Hm) = log
p(z |K,Hm)
p(z |Kb,Hm)
K = Kmin, . . . ,Kmax. (4.12)
For present purposes, however, we are really only interested in finding the single model with the
largest evidence rather than calculating the log-odds for all competing models∗.
4.7 Parameter Inference
Parameter inference plays only a marginal role within this text, and we therefore mention it only
in passing. Within context, the underlying modelM always stays the same, and the comparison
is between different values of one or more parameters α.




Once again making use of the generic equation (4.1) setting x to “the values of the parameters
are given by α” and y to “the data is D”, we obtain a second form of Bayes’ rule,
p(α | D,M) = p(D |α,M) p(α |M)
p(D |M)
(4.13)
in which the evidence appears in the denominator. The probability p(α | D,M) on the left hand
side is called the posterior and it plays a central role in fitting routines.
4.8 Information Criteria
Chapter 1 section 1.4.1 provided a brief overview of two prominent information criteria in liter-
ature which are widely applied to problems of model comparison. Within context, information





4.8.1 Akaike’s Information Criterion
Akaike (1974) formulated the AIC based on model selection on grounds of model similarity be-
tween their logarithmic Bayes factors. Within our context, the AIC has the form,
AIC = NQ(α̂) + 2K. (4.14)
We note that as more parameters are added, the chi-squared term tends to decrease, while the
number of parameters tend to increase. This can be seen as a compromise between underfitting
and overfitting to Occam’s razor.
4.8.2 Bayesian Information Criterion
Schwarz (1978) formulated the BIC fromwithin the Bayesian framework on grounds of model se-
lection in which the probability of selecting the best model increases with sample size (Burnham
and Anderson 2002, p. 286). Within our context, the BIC has the form,
BIC = NQ(α̂) +N logK. (4.15)
In contrast to BIC, AIC seeks to select the best model at a given sample size, and so, for AIC
the best model may vary with N ; for BIC on the other hand, its best model is independent of
N . Thus BIC aims to select the best model with accuracy which increases in proportion to the
sample size.
Based on the penalty terms, BIC is more tolerant of free parameters than AIC, but less tolerant
at higher N . As such, between the two criteria, AIC may be more likely to select an overfitting





Example 4.1 Sally’s Seashells II
Surmising tides subsequently secured soars in sales of Sally’s seashell selling service. In
hopes of improving her predictive ability, Sally decides to test her models, and in order

















Therefore, she has parametrisations of orders K,L ∈ {1, 2 . . . , 10} for both models, v
as well as w. In order to assess these models, she considers the AIC and BIC estimates,
as modelled by her data. Of course, knowing that higher order polynomials are poor
representatives, and knowing about the caveats of overfitting data, she expects higher
order models to be penalised. The models are evaluated as,
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(i) Progression of the AIC for Sally’s models.
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(ii) Progression of the BIC for Sally’s models.
Figure 4.3: Sally’s models evaluated by information criteria
Figures 4.3(i) and 4.3(ii) illustrates the performance of Sally’s models as evaluated by
the AIC and BIC respectively. Interestingly, both information criteria considers the best
polynomial to be of order 1, i.e. of the form v(x | α̂) = α̂1, and we know that this cannot
model the tidal variation at all. Despite order 4 (cubic) providing a visually pleasingmodel
of the data, the polynomial model is heavily penalised, therefore she concludes that the
polynomial model is inadequate for allK .
The sinusoidal model is evaluated to be best when L = 3 for both AIC and BIC! She
therefore concludes that her best model isw(x | α̂,M3).
Sally realises that both of her previous concerns had now been addressed: she was able to
model without the pitfall of overfitting, and at the same time penalise models which are
not only overfitting, but also poorer (according to her state of knowledge) representatives





5.1 Why Spherical Symmetry?
Let us briefly recapitulate the current state of affairs. Given data, z, a Gaussian likelihood and
minimal prior information on the parameters α, the aim is to calculate evidences of the form





p(K | z,Hm) =
p(z |K,Hm) p(K |Hm)
p(z |Hm)
K = Kmin, . . . ,Kmax
following which, we find the “best model” for the data from the available collection of model
posteriors, compactly represented as the “bestK”, which we may denote as K̂ .
As previously stated, we use the symbolHm to distinguish between the various choices of pa-
rameter prior, p(β |K,Hm). Given a particularHm, the desired evidence was previously set out
in equation (4.9) in terms of an integral overα, however, now that we are using the transformed




dβ p(z |β) p(β |K,Hm), (5.1)
where we have shortened notation for the likelihood as given by p(z |β,K,Hm) to p(z |β). We
consider it in this way for the reason that if β is known, thenK is automatically known as well,
and the likelihood does not depend on the choice of prior noted inHm.
The likelihood is given and fixed (as set out in section 3.6) and after transformation of the
originalK-dimensional parameters α to the symmetricK-dimensional parameters β, it is




with Q(β) = Q(β̂) + (β − β̂)T (β − β̂)
where the parameters are defined by β̂ = Λ1/2 Sα̂. By “spherically symmetric”, it refers to the
likelihood having the same value at all pointsβ on the surface of theK-dimensional hypersphere
centred at β̂, for which
∥∥β − β̂∥∥ is a constant. We call this hypersphere “non-central”, since its
origin does not coincide with the origin of parameter space.
We now introduce a second spherical symmetry in theK-dimensional parameter space, namely
the symmetry in that of the parameter prior. Consider the following






for which we have spherical symmetry on the parameter prior such that it depends only on the
norm of the parameters (or geometrically, the radius∗), and not on the individual components of
β. Thus, it follows that
p(β |K,Hm)
!
= f(R |K,Hm), (5.3)




for some function f . The exact form of the function f is a matter of choice, as long as it is
non-negative and its integral over dβ is 1.
This assumption of spherical symmetry of the parameter prior on the “central” hypersphere
is equivalent to stating that the observer’s information remains unchanged under rotation of β
around the origin; it can be viewed as a “rotational” Principle of Indifference∗ or “information
isotropy”, which states that p(β |K,Hm) must be uniformly distributed over the surface of the
hypersphere with radius ‖β‖, and for any such radius, therefore the prior has dependence only
on ‖β‖ (De Kock and Eggers 2017b, p. 7).
5.2 Spherical & Hyperspherical Coordinates
On the way towards finding acceptable forms of f and expanding its application, we reiterate






Figure 5.1: Spherical coordinates for
K = 3.
spherical coordinates in K dimensions. Motivated by the
previous section, we now deliberately denote the radius by
R. ForK = 3, the transformation from the cartesian coordi-
nates to the spherical coordinates is well known, and defined
by
x = R cos θ sinϕ, y = R sin θ sinϕ, z = R cosϕ.
Note that that the azimuthal angle θ is within the domain
[0, 2π], while the polar angle, ϕ, introduces the variation
along a new axis, and only needs to span [0, π] in order for (R, θ, ϕ) to span the entire (x, y, z)
space. It is also well known that the (absolute value of) the Jacobian matrix for the change of
variables is
|J3| :=
∣∣∣∣det[ ∂(x, y, z)∂(R, θ, ϕ)
]∣∣∣∣ = R sinϕ.
For the lowK , we could still manage with unsubscripted symbols as tabulated below,
K Cartesian coordinates Spherical coordinate transformation
2 (x, y) (R cos θ, R sin θ)
3 (x, y, z) (R cos θ sinϕ, R sin θ sinϕ, R cosϕ)
4 (x, y, z, w) (R cos θ sinϕ sinφ, R sin θ sinϕ sinφ, R cosϕ sinφ, R cosφ)
However, for generalK wemust use subscripted Cartesian coordinates, xk, and spherical angles,
θℓ to describe the transformation,
(x1, x2, . . . , xK) → (R, θ1, θ2, . . . , θK−1) or x → (R,θ)
∗ The Principle of Indifference: when there is no reason to say that one hypothesis is more plausible than another,
then all hypotheses should be weighed equally.
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5.3 Radii & Scales in Fixed Dimension & All Dimensions





k, and coordinate transformations given by
x1 = R cos θ1 sin θ2 sin θ3 · · · sin θK−1
x2 = R sin θ1 sin θ2 sin θ3 · · · sin θK−1
x3 = R cos θ2 sin θ3 · · · sin θK−2
...
...
xK−1 = R sin θK−2 sin θK−1




∂(x1, x2, . . . , xK)
∂(R, θ1, . . . , θK−1)
=

∂Rx1 ∂θ1x1 . . . ∂θK−1x1
∂Rx2 ∂θ1x2 . . . ∂θK−1x2
...
... . . .
...
∂RxK ∂θ1xK . . . ∂θK−1xK
 (5.5)
whose determinant is found to be
|JK | = RK−1 sin θ1 sin2 θ2 sin3 θ3 · · · sinK−2 θK−2 = RK−1F (θ)
In summary, the transformation from a K-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system leads to a
K-dimensional hyperspherical coordinate systemwhich consists of one radius andK−1 angles,
with θ1 ∈ [0, 2π] and θ2, . . . , θK−2, θK−1 ∈ [0, π].
For future use, we note that the integral over all angles of the determinant is given by a product
of RK−1 and an angular factor F (θ) and is found to be
AK(R) =
∫





Which is, in fact, the surface area of the K-dimensional hypersphere. The derivation of this
result is treated at length in appendix C.
5.3 Radii & Scales in Fixed Dimension & All Dimensions
5.3.1 Spherical Symmetry in Earlier Work
• Zellner (1986) proposed the g-prior is, which (in our notation) is defined as











where X is the same design matrix used in the linear trial function. In other words, α is
distributed according to a K-dimensional Gaussian with covariance matrix gσ2(XTX)−1,
which means that








In Zellner’s formulation, the parameter g > 0 was fixed for analysis but could be chosen
freely, while σ was a free parameter with its own prior. In our present context of fixed
experimental uncertainties, we do not consider σ a variable but fixed. It will eventually be
set to 1 but we keep it for the moment to keep track of all scale parameters.
Since Zellner’s g-prior is a Gaussian, the integral equation (1.17) can be solved analytically,
making for easy and convenient use.
• One pitfall of the g-prior is that the posterior can be reasonable even if g is chosen to be
large in an effort to be uninformative. Liang et al. (2007, p. 8) showed that if g → ∞,
then comparing Bayes factors will tend to zero and in turn favour the smallest model,
irrespective of the information or the data, which is undesired in model selection. Such a
phenomenon is known as Bartlett’s Paradox.




(1− g)−a/2 , g > 0 (5.9)
which is proper for a > 2. Calculations with the hyper-g prior, like the g-prior, allowed for



















• We recognise that spherical symmetry was included within their contexts, for example,
observe that equation (5.7) may be expressed by spherically symmetric parametersβ, since
αTHα = βTβ, and that equation (5.10) incorporates the symmetric parameters.
5.3.2 Scales as a Guide for Model Comparison
The idea of spherical symmetry as approached in section 5.1 is, of course, nothing new; it was
already implicit within the formalisms of both Liang et al. (2007) and Zellner (1986), having made
the choice of a Gaussian prior probability on the parameters, in which part of the utility of the
Gaussian distribution relied on the spherical symmetry of the distribution itself (De Kock and
Eggers 2017b, p. 2).
From the point of view of model comparison, however, spherical symmetry for fixedK is not
enough. Our stated aim of comparison of models with different K implies that we must now
think about comparing, for example, a radius on a K = 2 dimensional circle to a radius on a
K = 3 dimensional sphere, and so on.
In pure mathematics, there is of course no problem: we simply define a radius r and use it for any
and allK : there is no implicit scale which tells us whether a length r = 1 in e.g. two dimensions
is any different to r = 1 in four dimensions.
However, as soon as there are explicit scales involved, these scales must be taken into account.
Therefore, the proposed question is: What sets the scales for the radii in differently dimensioned
parameter spaces within context of our Bayesian linear regression?
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(i) Superimposed spherical spaces of dimensions
K = 1, K = 2, and K = 3, with their re-










(ii) Visualising planes in each dimension, the over-
aching radius spans all dimensions and estab-
lishes a common link between each respective
dimension (i.e. model).
Figure 5.2: Dimension specific radii RK and the overarching r.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the generic difference between K-specific radii, RK , and an overarching
mathematical radius r, which applies to all dimensions, in two distinct, yet related ways.
The question of scale-setting will be sought below for two different regimes: scales as set by
the likelihood and scales as set by the parameter priors. As previously explained, we do assume
that there is no other prior knowledge which separately sets a scale or imposes a constraint.
5.3.3 Scales for FixedK
First we consider the likelihood, for which scales are conceptually intuitive. For the likelihood, it
is always the squared scale which is of interest, therefore we shall reference squares. Moreover,
the radius can always be found by taking the square root of the scales that we define.
1. The squared scale in data space is set by the squared length of the data vector, such that












which will generally tend to a constant for largeN , and to write z2 = N〈z2〉.
2. The scale in model space is given by the model vector, ζ, whose minimum chi-squared





ζ̂ = Xα̂ = X(XTX)−1XTz = Pz (5.12)
Since PP = P, the squared model space scale is,
ζ̂2 = z
TPz; (5.13)











3. The squared scale in parameter space is given by the squared length of the maximum like-
lihood vector
(
which we could call R̂2K in analogy to equation (5.2)
)
,




The squared scale of the discrepancy between data space and model space is simply the
well-known minimum chi-squared criterion,





and is fully determined by 〈z2〉 and β̂2.
4. We note that the maximum likelihood point
β̂ = Λ
1/2 Sα̂ = Λ
1/2 S(XTX)−1XTz (5.17)
is a function both of the data and of the model, so the parameter space scale is set by a
combination of data and model information. Likewise, ζ̂ is determined both by the data
and the MLE. At this point something remarkable happens: the (N -normalised) model
space squared scale and the (unnormalised) parameter space squared scales are the same,
















is a sum overN terms and β̂2 is a sum overK terms, this equality links the
scales between model space and parameter space.
5.3.4 An Overarching Radial Scale for AllK
In the previous subsection, we have sought and found the appropriate scales for model space as
well as parameter space for some fixed K . As previously suggested, there is need for a higher
level of thinking about the problem. For everyK the parameter prior p(β |K,Hm) is spherically
symmetric about the origin; we have many spherical symmetries at the same time.
On the next level, the question is therefore: is there a radius r which applies to all models of
all dimensionsK? In other words, can model comparison across differentK be written in such
a way that all the spherical symmetries are taken into account, without favouring any one K?
In other words, can we design a radius r which is as insensitive as possible to the implicit scales
set by all the different β̂2 scales for differentK?
The question of an overarching radius was first considered by De Kock and Eggers (2017b), who
showed that the spherical symmetry in the the formalisms of Zellner (1986) and Liang et al.
(2007) with regards to the g- and hyper-g priors, are in fact special cases of a formulation which
introduces a dimension-transcendent radius, r, that is common to all models.
The benefit of a single r is an astonishingly simple formula for the so-called r-conditioned
likelihood which we rederive and extend in section 5.4.
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5.3 Radii & Scales in Fixed Dimension & All Dimensions
Before doing so, let us remain with the issue of scaling for a moment. We first note that





k implies that R scales as
√
K because each term in the sum is a square
and therefore positive. The scaling of R will not be exact but depend on the magnitude of each




Conceptually, we may think of this scaling as superimposing the dimensions of all K via the
radius r — in much the same way as visualised in figure 5.2. We therefore consider a prior for β
given r,
p(β | r,K,Hm) = c · δ(R− ℓr) (5.20)
with c a normalisation constant determined by 1 !=
∫
dβ p(β | r,K,Hm), and multiplied by the
Dirac delta∗. Following this prior, we consider a transformation to hyperspherical coordinates







dθ δ(ℓr −R) |JK | = c (ℓr)K−1
∫




and so (inserting ℓ into the notation for the prior)






The above discussion would motivate the choice such that ℓ =
√
K . Of course, we are not limited
to this particular choice of radial scale and we note that when ℓ = 1, then we recover previous,
unscaled results as used by De Kock and Eggers (2017b). We therefore postulate that ℓ could
be defined as a function of K , such that ℓ ∈ {K0,K1/2 ,K1, . . .}, or any suitable function of K
which can maintain the desired scale relation between r and R.
5.3.5 General Form for the Spherically Symmetric Prior
Priors are supposed to reflect one’s state of knowledge before the data is taken. Often, translating
that knowledge into a mathematical form is neither clear nor easy, so typically there is a choice of
prior. While choice of a prior may not necessarily be unique, at least there are some basic criteria
which should be applied as listed in section 4.5. The use of spherical symmetry in general, and a
spherically symmetric prior is consistent with that list of criteria.
In equation (5.3), the statement p(β |K,Hm)
!
= f(R |K,Hm) had been one of spherical sym-
metry on a K-specific radius R; now, we extend that assumption to state that the prior for β
should be symmetric also for every given r as already tested in equation (5.20). We now gener-
alise to find all possible forms for a spherically symmetric prior forβ given fixed r by demanding
that the prior be spherically symmetric (i.e. a function of ‖β‖ only) for every r,
p(β | r,K, ℓ,Hm)
!
= f(R | r,K, ℓ,Hm). (5.22)
∗ Note that there are two levels of Dirac delta“constraints”. The first being that which arises from equation (5.2),
which is originates from the coordinate transformation, and the second being the scaling of the radii of superimposed




Again, the function f in equation (5.22) must be some positive function of R; it can be written
as a probability density function (PDF) by introducing a normalisation constant,
p(β | r,K, ℓ,Hm)
!
= c p(R | r,K, ℓ,Hm). (5.23)
We emphasise that this is a statement of symmetry and not the result of a transformation to
a spherical coordinate system. However, the statement of a transformation of variables (as in
equation (5.4)) is still valid, and we will make use of it.
The new prior p(R | r,K, ℓ,Hm) clearly has the function of relating theK-specific radiusR to
the K-overarching radius, and we are free to choose whatever functional form we like, as long
as it is properly normalised over 0 ≤ R < ∞. In addition, p(β | r,K, ℓ,Hm) must be properly






dβ p(β | r,K, ℓ,Hm) =
∫
Ω(β)
dβ c p(R | r,K, ℓ,Hm) (5.24)
Note that the K-fold integral is over parameter space Ω(β), not just one variable R. At this
point, we transform coordinates from β to theK-spherical coordinates of equation (5.4):
dβ = dR dθ
∣∣∣∣ ∂(β)∂(R,θ)











dθ |JK | (5.26)
with |JK | = RK−1F (θ), and once again using the result of equation (5.6), it follows that
1
!








dRRK−1p(R | r,K,Hm). (5.27)
and inserting this into equation (5.23) we finally obtain









K−1 p(R | r,K,Hm)
(5.28)
This result is the most general form for a parameter prior consistent with spherical symmetry for
all possible K . We are free to choose any p(R | r,K,Hm) as long as it is properly normalised.
The special case equation (5.21) is the result of the choice
p(R | r,K,Hm) = δ(R− ℓr).
Note that the general form of equation (5.28) establishes a general projection onto a spherically
symmetric surface. The choice of the Dirac delta, as consistent with De Kock and Eggers (2017b),
corresponds to the projection onto the surface of a sphere∗.
∗ This projection can be thought of as the projection of the prior p(α), even though the prior in parameters α is not
considered explicitly, since we establish the prior in bprmb directly.
48
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
5.4 The r-Conditioned Likelihood
5.4 The r-Conditioned Likelihood
Identities 5.1
δ(x− y) = 2x δ(x2 − y2) (5.29)




ds exp(sx2 − sy2) (5.30)
Where C is along the imaginary line from (c− i∞) to (c+ i∞) (Watson 1922).
We now recalculate the evidence p(z |K,Hm) taking into account the assumption of extended
spherical symmetry and the overarching radius r. Note, once more, that K is the dimension of
our model and Hm is our choice in parameter assignment on the prior (for various m). Recall




dr p(z, r |K,Hm) =
∫ ∞
0
dr p(z | r,K,Hm) p(r |K,Hm) (5.31)
The “r-prior”, p(r |K,Hm), will be treated extensively later. The other factor p(z | r,K,Hm)
is the “r-conditioned likelihood” or simply r-likelihood which we now derive for the specific
scaling choice p(R | r,K,Hm) = δ(R− ℓr).
Expanding in terms of β similar to that in equation (5.1), the r-likelihood, as inclusive of ℓ, is
defined as
p(z | r,K, ℓ,Hm) =
∫
dβ p(z |β, r, ℓ) p(β | r,K, ℓ,Hm)
We express the β-likelihood and its exponents of equations (3.34) and (3.36) in the form








2 − 2〈β, β̂〉)
)
,
with C = (2π)−N/2 , and so the r-likelihood follows as
p(z | r,K, ℓ,Hm) =
∫
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(5.33)
With this result we have realised how all models are resolved in terms of the overarching ra-
dius. In other words, the K-dimensional system in parameter space has been reduced to a 1-
dimensional system in the radial dimension (De Kock and Eggers 2017b, p. 5). It is an effective
illustration of how the overarching radius encompasses all models.
5.5 The r-Prior
Having resolved the consequences of spherical symmetry of β for a fixed r, we now consider
the radial prior p(r |K,Hm), for which we need to complete the calculation of the evidence in
terms of equation (5.31). The introduction of the overarching radius was motivated by the need
to connect one variable in that of the radii of models with different K . Therefore, any prior for
r should preferably not depend onK at all.
Naturally the r-prior will be written in terms of one of the usual probability densities. This will
involve specifying one or more hyper-parameters, which are parameters that determine the form
of p(r |Hm). To keep track of these hyper-parameters, we will be adding them to the notation
of the r-prior as we proceed.
In principle, we can choose any functional form we like for the r-prior as long as 0 ≤ r < ∞
is allowed. It helps, however, to think of it as also being the result of projecting a hyper-prior
onto a sphere, in the same way that the Gaussian for z became a Gaussian for the parameters β
which were then projected onto the surface of the hypersphere with radius R.
Thus, if we assume r to be the radius of a hyper-prior in a K-dimensional spherically sym-
metric Gaussian for variables b = (b1, b2, . . . , bK) centred at the origin, with variance ∆2, then
projection onto the radial∗ probability follows the same path taken in previous sections. Doing
the calculation as usual, while also keeping track of the new hyperparametersK and∆,
p(r |∆,K,Hc) =
∫










2r δ(r2 − b2)
we obtain a probability density which can be understood as a so-called “central r2-Gamma distri-
















This result is closely related to the chi-squared distribution used in statistics. We have also for the
first time introduced the generic hypothesis symbol Hm as the specific Hc which as shorthand
for “central r2 Gamma distribution”.
What values should we assign to the two new hyperparameters,K and∆? For the time being,
we just consider K , for the moment. From equation (5.34), its role is clearly to specify at what
∗ This corresponds to moving from the spherical surface to within the spherical volume.
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power r grows, and we observe that the radius scales asK−1, which is essential for maintaining
spherical symmetry within a spherical volume. A larger K also implies a larger mean r and a
wider shape.
Since r is supposed to be invariant with respect to model order, there are no direct links be-
tween the values of K and the set of K = {Kmin, . . . ,Kmax} models considered during model
comparison, but it makes sense to not let K differ massively from this set, for that reason we
refer toK as the overarching model order.
This result may be extended when parametrising the r-prior according to aK-dimensional Gaus-





















We call the PDF in equation (5.34) the central gamma r-prior, and equation (5.35) the non-central
gamma r-prior (De Kock and Eggers 2017a, p. 9). We may observe that when γ2 = 0, then the
non-central prior simplifies to the central one. Once again, we note that both priors scale as
rK−1, which is necessary for maintaining spherical symmetry in a volume in spherical space∗.
5.6 r-Priors & r-Likelihoods: Summary of Dependencies
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Figure 5.3: Scheme of dependencies
In selecting an r-prior, we have free choice provided that we maintain the symmetry in spherical
space, this is in contrast to the frameworks of Zellner and Liang et al. which are restricted to
mixtures of conjugate priors (De Kock and Eggers 2017b, p. 2).
∗ When considering the prior on the radius, we are moving from the surface to within the volume, and we require
spherical symmetry in both cases, for the surface as well as within the volume. These two details are conceptualised
through sampling in spherical space in appendix C, first as sampling symmetrically on a spherical surface, and then




5.7 The Resulting Evidences
With an analytical expression for the r-likelihood in hand in equation (5.33) and with one of
the r-priors, either central or non-central, we can now find the evidence as an r-integral, as
already done by example in equation (5.31) (now including the hyperparameters inherited from
the prior),
p(z |K, ℓ,K,Hm) =
∫ ∞
0
dr p(z | r,K, ℓ,Hm) p(r |K,Hm) (5.36)
The fact that we are left with just a one-dimensional integral highlights the importance in util-
ising the framework of spherical symmetry. Here we have the evidence as expressed by a 1-
dimensional integral in contrast to the K-dimensional integral as before. Moreover, what we
have in terms of aK sensitive likelihood and aK insensitive prior may lead to a system with a
K sensitive evidence which results from a K insensitive prior. In other words, a prior which is
unbiased with respect to our candidate models, but an evidence which is sensitive to the candi-
date models.
In determining the evidence, we first consider the central r-prior of equation (5.34) and find
p(z |K, ℓ,K,Hm) =
∫













∣∣∣∣ N2(ℓ∆)22(Nℓ2∆2 + 1) β̂2
)
(5.37)
where againC = (2π)−N/2 . This result may be referred to as the central evidence. The asymptotic
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so that, recognising the minimum-chisquared criterion of equation (5.16) in the exponent, we get
for the log-evidence


















Which forms the central r-information criterion. For the purposes of model comparison, we are
interested only in theK-dependence, so the non-dependent terms may be omitted.




dr p(z | r, ℓ,K,Hm) p(r |γ,K,∆,Hγ)
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Since the Humbert Ψ2 function lacks an asymptotic form, we simply consider the quantity
−2 log p(z |γ,K,Hm) for the result in equation (5.40) to form the non-central r-information
criterion.
Note that in each case, for both central and non-central evidences, the results are fully analytic∗.
In this sense the problem associated with the curse of dimensionality in evidence calculations is
overcome via the framework of spherical symmetry, at least within the context of Gaussian linear
regression.
Once again, note that when γ → 0, the non-central variant reduces to the central case. With
γ2 being indefinite, it may be of consideration to marginalise this quantity from the evidence,
in which case assigning a uniform, but proper prior on γ2 is considered in the form of a half-











It is worth noting that γ should remain indeterminate unless our state of knowledge on the






















Similarly to the HumbertΨ2 function, the HumbertΨ1 function also lacks an appropriate asymp-
totic form, therefore we consider −2 log p(z |Hm) to define the marginalised non-central crite-
rion.
In contrast to this result, we shall elaborate on a setting which includes γ, instead of opting for
the marginalised evidence as seen here, thus we shall consider equation (5.40) to be the primary
result of the non-central evidence.
Note that the central and non-central evidences of equations (5.37) and (5.40) respectively sim-
plify to an exponential function and a Humbert Ψ1 function if K = K . If we set ℓ = 1, then
these results simplify further and yield those of De Kock and Eggers (2017a,b).






6.1 Multiple Model Linear Regression
Up to this point, we have focused on the inference using different models, which in our case
were defined by a fixed set of basis functions but including successively more of them; a K-
dimensional model consisted of K such functions. We now first show that all these models can
be put into a single vector-matrix equation representing a system in which we could respectively
model the data byKn distinct models of ordersK ∈ [Kmin,Kmax], whereKn = Kmax −Kmin.
For this we first revisit two results that we previously derived, the Moore-Penrose inverse as well
as the projection matrix,
α̂ = (XTX)−1XTz
P = X(XTX)−1XT
For the Kmax-dimensional vector α̂, we generally generated the N -dimensional vector of the
best model, ζ̂. Created in this way, this is essentially the model defined by Kmax parameters
and the full N×Kmax design matrix. In order to produce models of the subspaces thereof, i.e.
lesser order models, we make use of the projector of rank K , PK . This means that for the N×N
projection matrix P, which is full rank, the matrix PK is of rank K , yet of dimension N×N ,
essentially a consideration of P up toK columns, while the successiveN −K columns are zero.




The resultant formulation then includes Kn distinct models∗ of orders K ∈ [Kmin,Kmax]. For
any modelled data we will have Kn distinct χ2 estimates, in other words we generate a vector
containing elements of χ2K , which is the chi-squared criterion for each respective model,
χ2K = (z − ζK)
T
(z − ζK). (6.2)
In summary, we generateKn models of ordersK ∈ [Kmin,Kmax] by considering the projection
of z of not only the model order Kmax (i.e. design matrix of rank Kmax), but with respect to
all submodels of orderK , thus resulting in models of all orders fromKmin ranging up toKmax.
Essentially extending linear regression as previously formulated to that of multiple models.
6.1.1 Regression with Orthogonal Design Matrices
When concerned with simulation, and numerical computing in general, a choice in orthonormal
basis functions make part of an important part of numerical computation: simplifying linear
systems and numerical efficiency. Orthonormal basis functions yield an orthonormal design
∗ This is essentially an N×Kn matrix with each column representing a model of ascending order.
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matrix, which in turn results in XTX = H = I. Within context, this assignment is of high
importance, because the inverse of any high dimensional matrix may be non-trivial to compute,
in terms of both numerical complexity as well as time expenditure∗
Since the Fourier basis forms an orthogonal basis for L2, we consider the desired basis func-















and similarly we may also consider the basis functions as defined by the terms of the discrete











With these two definitions, we fulfil the orthogonality condition in having an orthonormal de-
sign matrix such that XTX = I. Under this condition many quantities that we have previously
encountered reduce to simpler forms, for example the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse simplifies
to α̂ = XTz and the best model vector becomes ζ̂ = Pz = XXTz, among others.
6.2 Generating Simulated Data
This far we have focused exclusively on aspects of inference, where data is given. We shall now
explore a system for simulation of data. Chapter 3 detailed data and the levels thereof extensively.
We encountered three different aspects pertaining to data as
1. Physical data and its origin.
2. The description of existing data
3. The numerical simulation of artificial data
For the purposes of generating simulated data, we are considering aspect (3) as the simulation
of artificial data, where simulated data ≡ artifical data. Moreover, we considered the concept of
data from additive error , which for data zn, was represented by
zn = y(xn) + an + ρn
where an accounts for systematic distortion (which is the same under repeated experiments), al-
though in simulation there is no consideration of systematic error. On the other hand, ρ accounts
for noise random variation (which is different under repeated experiments). Within all analysis
of data, the underlying “true” law is always unknown — but not within the realm of simulation!
Beyond the inference involved with the analysis of data, when dealing with simulation our
state of knowledge now includes all aspects of data, meaning that we know the variation which
the “true” law experience with experiments, but most importantly, we know the “true” law, or
rather the “true” function.
∗ This is particularly important if numerical precision has to be taken into account, in that precision may represent
zero by a value of really small order, typically 10−20, and the identity matrix with these terms may not be seen in





To avoid philosophical discussions regarding the nature of “truth”, we shall henceforth refer
to the “true” function as the construct, denoted by z̃. Therefore we may speak of simulated
data generated according to the construct. We may consider the mathematics of specifying the
construct as the same as which we have for specifying candidate models, i.e. design matrix,
parametrisations, etc.
Of course, it is important to carefully distinguish between quantities of inference, such as the
model orderK , and equivalent quantities of simulation. We introduce the the quantitiesC,Cmin,
and Cmax as representative of the order of the construct (in simulation).
We assign to the construct the same definition aswe hadwith themodels, forC ∈ [Cmin, Cmax],
that is a linear system of parameters and basis functions,




z̃ = X̃α̃ (6.5)
The construct’s design matrix, X̃, is of dimension N×C , and the construct is paramtrised by C
parameters, α̃, and so on. We maintain a distinction between C, z̃, X̃, α̃ from their inference
counterpartsK, z,X,α.
In much the same way in how we have defined candidate models of differing orders (with
the projector), we may define constructs of differing orders, and for constructs of orders C ∈
[Cmin, Cmax] we have that,
z̃C = X̃Cα̃C (6.6)
We now have a set of Cn = Cmax − Cmin constructs, from which we are able to produce a data
set from each construct, i.e. we have would have Cn distinct data sets. Since we are considering
the data to be generating according to additive noise, we thus have
zC = z̃C + ρ, (6.7)
where ρ is sampled from N (0, σ2ρ). Having Cn constructs, each of differing orders, we sub-
sequently have Cn different data sets, each generated by a construct of ascending order. We
emphasise that ρ is generated anew for each of the Cn data sets; this generates unique data for
eachC and thereby avoids unwanted correlations between data sets generated with constructs of
differingC . For the purposes of the inference part, each simulated data set is deemed immutable,
as always.
6.2.2 Parametrising the Construct
The construct parameters α̃ serve as a control of the signal-to-noise ratio. If the design matrix X̃
is defined according to either the cosine or the sine basis functions as in equations (6.3) and (6.4),
then α̃ can be thought of as an amplitude, which makes a signal strong or weak. Given that σρ
is a constant, that also determines the signal-to-noise ratio.
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To create a large variety of data, α̃ itself is made to vary. De Kock and Eggers (2017a) and Liang
et al. (2007) parameterise α̃ according to a normal distribution, and we follow their example in
spirit by proposing the following options for the construct parameters, with ϕC representing
the random variable and a and b representing tuning parameters which determine whether the
simulated data has either a weak or strong signal-to-noise ratio. The options investigated were
Option A: α̃ = a+ bϕC ϕC ∼ N (a, b2σ2ϕ) (6.8)
Option B: α̃ = aσϕ + bϕC ϕC ∼ N (aσϕ, b2σ2ϕ) (6.9)
Option C: α̃ = a+ bϕCσϕ ϕC ∼ N (a, b
2) (6.10)
In assessing these options, we make use of dimensional analysis. To keep different concepts
pertaining to N and C separate, we momentarily denote the dimension associated with ϕ by D
and that of the parameters α̃ by P . We also assign a “dimension” to the basis functions associated
with the design matrix X̃ , even though they are often dimensionless. The “dimensions” of these
three quantities are then constrained byD = FP , considering that
dim(ϕC) = dim(σϕ) = dim(α̃C) = P
dim(ρn) = dim(σρ) = dim(zn) = D
For dimensionless basis functions, the dimensions D and P are equal, and the scales of σϕ and
σρ can be compared directly. For option A in equation (6.8), control parameters a and b have
different dimensions, which is undesirable in terms of comparison. Additionally, option C in
equation (6.10) would leave α̃C dimensionless even while dim(ϕC) = P , therefore option B
in equation (6.9) provides the only option in which both control parameters are dimensionless.
Hence we settle on












α̃C ∼ N (aσϕ, b2σ2ϕ) (6.12)




f̃C(xn)(aσϕ + bϕc) + ρn (6.13)
Although expectation values of any real data may never be taken within the Bayesian frame-
work∗, however, within the context of simulated data, our state of knowledge permits expectation
values, although this is not directly over the data, rather abstracted to the levels of randomness
contained within α̃C , i.e. ϕC , as well as ρn.
Given that E(ϕ2C) = σ2ϕ and E(ϕC) = 0 for the signal and for the noise E(ρ2n) = σ2ρ and
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ρ (6.17)
If we consider the simple case when σϕ = 1, then all the options for the tuning parameters
become identical and we recover the statement made by De Kock and Eggers (2017a, p. 12). In
much the same way, the simplest assignment for the noise distribution isN (0, 1), where σρ = 1.
In accordance with Liang et al. (2007, p. 19), higher amplitudes result in a strong signal-to-
noise ratio, while lower amplitudes result in a weak signal to noise ratio. With the current
specification, for any fixed b, we may tune the signal-to-noise ratio with a, and in doing so, we
will use below the terms “weak signal” for a = 1 and “strong signal” for a = 5.
6.3 Modelling Simulated Data
Having established our understanding of the construct and the conceptual underpinning of data
generated according to additive noise, with ρ, and also knowing that we model data according to
additive noise∗, w.r.t. ε as previously formalised (as in sections 3.3 to 3.5), we are now interested
in modelling any of the Cn data sets, zC , with any of the available models, ζK .
It is essential to understand that the aim of modelling data is to correctly predict, by means
of the model posterior p(K | zC), the order of the construct, C , in each data set, and this is the
importance of why we have Cn distinct sets of data.
Of course, if we haveKn models, then each (!) data set zC is modelled by all (!) Kn models. In
other words, our analysis produces aCn×Kn matrix of minimum chi-squared estimates (one for
each model and for each respective data set). The minimum chi-squared criterion for any given
model which models any given data set becomes,
χ̂2CK = z
2
C − β̂2CK (6.18)
with which we are able to evaluate the respective information criteria against each model for all
data sets.
6.3.1 Finite Accuracy in Predictions
We learned from chapter 3 that when overfitting data, the candidate model tends to regard noise
in the data as signal and the chi-squared criterion tends to zero in that case, i.e. it models each




6.3 Modelling Simulated Data
data point (withN parameters). With the established definition of the construct and the general
idea behind generating simulated data, we may now get an idea in seeing how we are able to
predict the construct by considering the accuracy in our prediction.
If we set the noise to zero in the simulated data such that (σρ = 0), then z = z̃, then we are
modelling the construct directly, and with the understanding of the projection, we note that a
construct of arbitrary order C can be modelled as
ζ̂ = PX̃α̃ (6.19)
The only way for any model, ζ, to model the construct accurately, irrespective of C , would be
to assume that there exists some construct such that z̃ = ζ = Xα. Therefore, there exists a
candidate model of orderK , which models the construct such that we have the following,
ζ = X(XTX)−1XT(Xα)
= Xα (6.20)
What this means is that the only model which could ever return the construct is the one which
models all data points, and not the model with K = C . Recall that this example models the
construct without the presence of noise!
Of course, from a theoretical perspective the desired model is indeed the one in which the
order of the candidate model matches the construct which modelled the data: K = C , and for
this, the importance of model selection via evidence and information criteria is only reinforced.
6.3.2 Model Evaluation
With knowledge of the construct, we follow Liang et al. (2007, p. 19) in determining the theoret-
ical squared error between the construct and the model, with each construct considered against
each respective model. The squared error loss between construct and model is defined as,
SECK = ‖z̃C − ζK‖2 (6.21)
Given that every quantity has been set up as a matrix, this also yields a matrix of dimension
Cn×Kn, and we consider the models evaluated by information criteria against the squared er-
ror, for which a lower squared error ensures a better result. When the order of the candidate
model matches the order of the construct, C = K , the candidate would be considered to be the
ideal prediction of the construct when modelling the data, so these are the ideal estimates when
evaluating a model. This ideal is known as the Oracle, which tells when a prediction may be
correct (or true).
The Oracle estimates lie on the main diagonal when Cn = Kn. For cases when Cn 6= Kn,
we consider two cases. The first case occurs when the orders of all Cn constructs are contained
within the orders of the Kn models and the second when the orders of the constructs are not
fully contained within those of the models.
For the first case we would have that Kmin < Cmin and C < K ; as such the Oracle occurs
on the Cmin-superdiagonal. This generalises to whenever Cmin < K . For the second case we
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(i) C ∈ {6, 7, 8} andK ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
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(ii) C ∈ {1, 2, 3} andK ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
Figure 6.1: SE for data generated according to constructs of order C and modelled according to models of
orderK . Oracle estimates are indicated in red, either on the sub- or superdiagonal.
If there are no instances in which C = K , then there is nothing to compare the squared error
result to, since such an analysis would have no Oracle. For the sake of our current study, we shall
consider the case in which Cmin = Kmin and Cmax = Kmax, thus resulting in a square matrix,
since Cn = Kn, which in turn eliminates the complication of modelling data without having a
baseline estimate for the evaluated models. For this we have a squared error assignment for each
model against which we assess their respective information criteria.
In addition, it is important to note that the squared error analysis can be performed for any
system where our state of knowledge provides enough information on z̃, such as in simulation,
the Oracle estimate is only useful in cases when X̃ = X. Therefore we define our construct
according to the same basis functions as the model.
The procedure detailed up to this point outlines one complete simulation in which Kn models
(each of ascending order) are applied to Cn datasets (each generated according to constructs of
ascending order). Models are assessed in terms of the available information criteria, based and
weighed against the theoretical squared error as given by equation (6.21). We consider themean
squared error (MSE) for T trials of each possible model-dataset pair, i.e. we perform T complete
simulations in total.






In summary, what is achieved with this matrix formulation is the ability to analyse Cn distinct
data sets withKn distinct models in one fell swoop!
Note that the matrix formulation developed here differs from past occurrences in literature
in that we have generalised the square matrix system, with Cn = Kn, to any arbitrary matrix
system of Cn×Kn; furthermore, we make the difference between C and K explicit, which in
turn provides us with freedom to perform inferences on systems where X̃ 6= X.
6.4 Simulation Study
6.4.1 Initialising the Simulation
Our simulation was performed with the following settings:
N T Cmin Cmax Kmin Kmax fk(x)




Simply stated, we generate 25 unique sets of data, each of 100 points, model each of the 25 data
sets with 25 models, perform the analysis and repeat the procedure over 1000 trials. We shall
consider two cases of the simulation with respect to the signal to noise ratio, both strong and
weak signal to noise ratios, with a = 5 and a = 1 respectively. At present, we set ∆ = 1 in
equations (5.37) and (5.40), since we cannot make a meaningful assignment at present, the scale
of∆ in particular, is unknown, therefore∆ = 1 remains as the choice at present.
6.4.2 The Central r-prior: Investigating the Radial Scale & the Overarching Model
We first turn to the investigation of the effect that the radial scale factor ℓ and the overarching
model orderK may have on the central information criterion that resulted from the evidence of
equation (5.37). With the theory for these quantities outlined in section 5.3, we have considered
the ideal representation of the ℓ =
√
K , while the overarching model’s order, K was set to
K = Kmax at minimum (recall that we choose it to be similar to a possible K), since allK form
subspaces ofKmax.
Alternative choices, such as ℓ = {K0,K1/2 ,K1, . . .} and K = Kmax + 1, . . . , N , also form
part of the investigation and analysis.
In testing any of these possibilities, we compared the results with those of the original as per
De Kock and Eggers (2017b), for which (in our framework) ℓ = 1 and K = K . We refer to
the De Kock and Eggers (2017b) settings as the classical central information criterion. The best
combination between ℓ andK shall be chosen as the desired central information criterion.
The Overarching Model Order
We first consider the case when ℓ = 1 throughout, since this allows us to investigateK without
the influence of the radial rescale. We first consider the postulated quantities of K , namely K
and N ,
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Figure 6.2: InvestigatingK : strong signal (lower is better), with ℓ = 1 for all criteria.
Figure 6.2(i) illustrates that settingK separately from the model’sK results in a substantial per-
formance improvement. We also see that the overarching model order ofK initially outperforms
that of N , and partial convergence is achieved for predicting constructs of higher orders. Fig-
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(ii) Difference between MSE and Oracle
Figure 6.3: InvestigatingK : weak signal (lower is better), with ℓ = 1 for all criteria.
As illustrated in figure 6.3, under weak signal analysis under the same condition, the classical
criterion is better than K = N but a little worse than K = Kmax. When predicting constructs
of higher orders, theN -based criterion converges to the classical and theK-based criterion falls
marginally short in comparison, even though being the best midway.
Similar analyses were performed for alternate postulates ofK , which include both indexed and
fixed orders, and the results which returned the best performance overall, are those that were
initially postulated, and displayed by figures 6.2 and 6.3. As such, we settle on the overarching
model order ofK = Kmax, which fixes the order to the order of the maximum model in our set
of candidate models. This choice is based on the achieved results in which it was overall the most
consistent between the regimes of weak and strong signal to noise ratios.
The Radial Scale Factor
Having established the overarching model order, we no longer use the classical criterion as our
baseline but rather the case withK = Kmax. Setting ℓ = 1 would provide us with the overarch-
ing criterion of the previous section, which we know outperforms the classical central criterion.
Therefore we are now searching for the scale factor whichwill improve on the performance of the
overarching criterion. Once again, we begin with the postulated scales of ℓ =
√
K and ℓ = K ,
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For strong signal, the performance when ℓ = 1 is evidently better than either ℓ =
√
K or ℓ = K
over nearly all 25 sets of data, however it is onlymarginally so compared to ℓ =
√
K which shows
more stability in comparison (particularly for lower C). ℓ = K displays poor performance as
well as instability relative to the other two criteria.
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Figure 6.5: Investigating ℓ: weak signal (lower is better), withK = Kmax for all criteria.
For weak signal ℓ =
√
K provides the best performance for low C , but as C increases, the
performance of the ℓ = 1 case improves, for which it has the best performance for higher C .
Various regimes were tested, which include both indexed and fixed scenarios for ℓ, such as
indexed assignments including {K,K2, . . .} and fixed assignments including {K,N}. In each
case the results were similar to figures 6.4 and 6.5, in which the ℓ = 1 criterion had the best
performance for weak signal while the
√
K criterion had the most stability.
Here the result is not as clear-cut as with the overarching model order; we obtain varying
results for any given radial scale ℓ depending on the regime of weak or strong signal-to-noise
ratio. However, we choose ℓ =
√
K based on the stability which it provides over the unit ℓ. We
shall henceforth consider any central criterion as scaled by ℓ =
√
K and with overarching model
orderK = Kmax.
6.4.3 The Non-central r-prior: Investigating the Location Parameter
For the non-central information criterion based on the evidence of equation (5.40), we consider




The first issue that we considered was γ2 as a location parameter and the second was whether√
K may be a suitable location in terms of how this relates to themaximum likelihood in spherical
space. In reference to a known result, we consider this to be the information criterion of the non-
central evidence in which γ2 is marginalised, as in equation (5.42) and per De Kock and Eggers
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(ii) Difference between MSE and Oracle
Figure 6.6: Investigating γ2: strong signal (lower is better)
From figure 6.6, we first note that the marginalised non-central criterion closely resembles
the central criterion, while the best overall performance is achieved by γ2 = K more so than
γ2 =
√
K , but both of the latter outperform the former.
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(ii) Difference between MSE and Oracle
Figure 6.7: Investigating γ2: weak signal (lower is better)
For the weak signal shown in figure 6.7, we once again have that the marginalised non-central
criterion performs similarly to the central criterion, while the criterion with γ2 =
√
K performs
marginally worse for higher order C , and the criterion with γ2 = K diverges fairly early in
comparison, with relatively poor performance for higher order C .
The fact that the marginalised non-central criterion is so similar in performance to that of
the central criterion, for both weak and strong signal cases, is a real validation to the effect of
the radial scaling and the overarching model (and the choices made thereof), because we have
managed to match the performance of the modern (non-central) criterion by introducing these
quantities to the classical (central) criterion. In addition to these cases, an investigation was
launched for the case γ2 =
√
Kmax, with relation to the overarching model order, which was
convergent to the indexed case in figures 6.6 and 6.7.
For this reason we no longer need to consider the marginalised non-central criterion, instead
we shall settle on the non-central criterion of γ2 =
√
K , since it provides decent performance
of the investigated scenarios for the non-central criterion, while still differing enough from the
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central criterion — and we desire this difference. We shall henceforth consider any non-central
result to have the setting γ2 =
√
K .
6.5 Comparative Results Versus Known Information Criteria
With the established criteria for the central and the non-central information criteria in context
of the introduced framework of radial scaling, overarching model order, and the non-central
location, we now study the performance of the central and non-central information criteria in
comparison to some well-known information criteria, namely AIC, BIC and the hyper-g.
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Figure 6.8: Strong signal performance of various information criteria (lower is better).
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Figure 6.9: Weak signal performance of various information criteria (lower is better).
The performance of the non-central and the central criteria are similar in both strong and weak
signal regimes, with the non-central criterion marginally outperforming the central within the
strong signal regime, while the central criterion marginally outperforms the non-central in the
weak signal regime. This is the case over all constructed data sets, except for data generated by
a construct of lower order in the weak signal regime, in which they are similar.
Compared to the performance of the other information criteria, within the strong signal regime
both offer better performance than than all criteria, while also being on par with the BIC, and




however, this is inverted: performance of the BIC and both central and non-central criteria wors-
ens with data of ascending construct order.
Therefore in each case the behaviour of both the central and non-central criteria follow a trend
similar to that of the BIC, with significantly better performance in the weak signal regime.
In order to explore the behaviour between regimes inmore detail, we consider the performance
of the criteria over a single data set with fixed C for both signal strength regimes as a function
of K . In doing so we consider the candidate models of orders in a range surrounding the order
of the construct which generated the data to provide a detailed view∗.
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(i) Data generated by construct of order 6, modelled by
models of ordersK ∈ [1, 10].
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(ii) Data generated by construct of order 15, modelled by
models of ordersK ∈ [10, 20].
Figure 6.10: Mean progressions of the information criteria for specific data sets.
In both figures 6.10(i) and 6.10(ii) the upper curves result from the strong signal regime, while
the lower curves result from the weak signal regime. The best model (for the given fixed C) is
the one at which each curve reaches its minimum.
We note that within both cases AIC and BIC converge once K ≥ C , meaning that it makes
no distinction of the signal-to-noise ratio. The hyper-g as well as the central and non-central
criteria maintain the distinction between weak and strong signal.
The distinction is important since we hope to maintain accuracy in predictions irrespective of
the regime, which may be unknown, because we then have a framework which may provide
meaningful results irrespective of the regime, and when considering real data, the regime of
strong or weak signal-to-noise ratios is unknown. This is unlike the BIC, which underfits in
figure 6.10(ii) for weak signal and loses quality in predictions. Therefore the verification that the
distinction is maintained, as with the hyper-g criterion, is a good indication of the assessments
made by the r-criteria, both central and non-central.
∗ The low number of candidate models aids in the readability, since the models of order not near that of the construct




The Bayesian Theory of Probability
We provided an introduction to systems of deductive and inductive reasoning in the respective
forms of propositional logic and uncertainty logic, after which uncertainty logic was formally
investigated and shown to be described by the framework of Bayesian probability theory. This
was proven (in full) on the grounds of a new formalism as accounted in appendix A.
Data Modelling & Model Comparison
The setting in which our primary research questions arise was developed by introducing the
concepts behind data and datamodelling, for whichwemodelled systems of data via least squares
and linear regression. We showed that the fundamental idea behind modelling data requires
greater insights than are provided by these methods and the chi-squared criterion.
These insights are found, in both, information theory (in the form of information criteria), and
within the framework of Bayesian probability theory. Both formalisms aim to solve the primary
dilemma in data modelling, namely knowing which model best describes a given set of data.
Spherical Symmetry
The framework of spherical symmetry was employed within our setting of data modelling and
model comparison, for which a generalised projection onto a spherically symmetric surface was
developed. In addition, critical insights into radial scales between model order and respective
radii were obtained. Furthermore, it was shown and conceptualised how models may be en-
veloped by an overarching model for which an overarching radius spanning all models exists.
These insights were incorporated into the framework and shown to be an essential part of r-
priors and their resulting evidences. These insights are shown to have extended the existing
body of work on spherical symmetry.
The Radial Scale and the Overarching Model
The principal new ideas introduced into the framework of spherical symmetry were the radial
scale factor ℓ, and the concept of the overarching model, leading to the parameterK (the overar-
ching model order). These two ideas provided us with a means of tuning the information criteria
in ways that had not been achieved before.
Investigations into how K affected the performance of information criteria with regards to
model selection provided insights which showed that this new parameter delivered improve-
ments to what had already been established in the literature of r-priors.
The radial scale factor, on the other hand, induces some variation between the strong- and
weak-signal regimes. This is a hint that knowledge of the signal strength may influence the
performance of the criteria based on the radial scale. For this reason, we know that there is a
need formore informationwith regards to the scope and effects of the radial scale factor as well as
potential choices thereof. The variation with signal strength provides a hint that the radial scale
may best be left indeterminate and marginalised from the evidence, since our state of knowledge
may be inadequate in an appropriate assignment for ℓ without reference to the signal-to-noise
ratio — however this is still open to investigation.




that the non-central information criterion performs on par with the central information criterion,
with stability in performance for both strong- and weak-signal regimes in our assignment of
γ2. Moreover, we discovered that when marginalised from the evidence, the marginalised non-
central and the central information criteria provide remarkably similar results, therefore we relax
the necessity on marginalising it from the evidence, as was the case in established literature.
Future Outlook
One natural extension to the formalism for both the central and the non-central criteria would
be that which was introduced by De Kock and Eggers (2017a), namely considering an extended
model with a noise model which parametrises the noise as an extension to the candidate model.
Known results involving this extended model indicate an improvement over the performance of
the current non-central information criterion, particularly in the weak signal regime.
This is of course on the basis that we know and understand the current base model, that results
based on the marginalised non-central information criterion of the past have been matched or
exceeded as indicated in this study.
Therefore, provided with adequate improvements to the current state of knowledge regarding
the radial scaleindexScale!Radial scale, the extended model may improve with the introduction
of both the overarching model as well as the radial scale factor which were introduced within
this study.
Specifically, the formalism of the radial scale factor and the overarching model would find
application to the noise space models, thus introducing two unique radial scales and overarching
models — one pair in model space and one pair in noise space.
In addition to these advancements, we are inclined to explore two facets of the prior, first the
parameter prior, and second the r-prior. With the generalised constraint on a prior projected
onto a spherically symmetric surface we have greater freedom in choice of prior, therefore we
have greater freedom in the outcome of the r-likelihood.
When constructing the r-prior, we assigned it through a hyper parametrisation, however, we
know that we are conditioned on the prior scaling according to rK−1, and with this knowledge
we also have a certain choices for suitable r-priors.
These two prior considerations may lead to noteworthy investigations regarding the frame-





Foundations of Bayesian Probability Theory
A.1 Axioms of Uncertainty Logic
This section aims to formalise the framework of uncertainty logic, therefore the exposition is
technical and mathematically demanding. The material presented here was sourced and synthe-
sised from (Jaynes 2003), (Cox 1961) and (Cox 1946).
Deviating from the formalism highlighted by Jaynes (2003) and many others, who opt for a func-
tional justification of proposed axioms based on the desiderata, we follow guidelines from the
formalism of Terenin and Draper (2017) who propose axioms justified by the desiderata, which
are in turn used to produce the foundation for the framework of uncertainty logic. However, un-
like their formalism which is asserted through set theory, we detail an analytic formalism within
the framework of propositional logic and assert its equivalence to the functional formalism.
First, we begin by constructing a set of suitable axioms,
Axiom A.1: Real number representation
States of uncertainty are represented by real numbers.
Axiom A.1 follows directly from our first desideratum. The implication is that we now have a
means of ordering our convictions in states of uncertanty, since real numbers are transitive. Fol-
lowing this ordering, we consider “more believable/reasonable/plausible” to represent our convic-
tion in a state of uncertainty — meaning that we can represent greater conviction with a greater
number and lesser conviction with a lesser number. In other words, the more convinced we are,
the greater the outcome of an evaluated state of uncertainty.
Suppose we have propositions w, y, and z with states of uncertainty in each, ψ(w), ψ(y),
and ψ(z), then if ψ(w) is more convincing than ψ(y), and ψ(y) is more convincing than ψ(z), it
follows that the convictions in our states of uncertainty may be ordered asψ(w) ≥ ψ(y) ≥ ψ(z).
Real numbers also possess the property of density, which means that there always exists a
number between any two numbers. Therefore, if we introduce a new proposition, x, with the
state of uncertainy ψ(x), of which this state may, for example, be more convincing thanψ(y) but
less than ψ(w), then it naturally implies that ψ(w) ≥ ψ(x) ≥ ψ(y) ≥ ψ(z). This is true for any
collection of propositions. Furthermore, this extends the reasoning of the second desideratum,
providing a representation that small changes in the knowledge of a proposition may indeed
yield small changes in its state of uncertainty.
Additionally, we may extend axiom A.1 by asserting postulates∗ which aim to formalise and
expand upon the axiom,
Postulate A.1: Logical propositions exist within a field
Let Ω be a space of logical propositions and let F be a field with σ-algebra on Ω.
∗ The terms postulate and axiom are often used interchangeably, however we consider postulates to be a slightly




A.1 Axioms of Uncertainty Logic
Here Ω is a space containing propositions in the field F under σ-algebra. We consider the field
to be consistent with the operators AND as well as OR. This algebra implies that for any element
contained in Ω, its negation is also contained within F, therefore NOT is included in this system,
meaning that our entire framework of propositional logic is consistent within this setting. This
algebra is also closed under countable disjunctions∗, meaning that if countablymany propositions
exist in F, then their disjunctions also exist in F.
Note that σ-algebra is usually defined as an algebra of sets, but we are able to formulate it in
terms of propositional logic given that we have highlighted the equivalences of set theory and
propositional logic; both are underpinned by Boolean algebra. In the context of propositional
logic, the space Ω is not a necessary requirement, since such a collection of elementary proposi-
tions is not always necessary — however, we impose that propositional logic always comprises
of the two trivial propositions, namely 1 (true) and 0 (false), therefore this space may always be
constructed within this framework of logical reasoning.
Postulate A.2: Measure on F
Let ψ be a measure on F such that ψ : F× (F \ 0) → R ⊆ R, with representation
ψ(x | y) for any x ∈ F and y ∈ (F \ 0).
Note that axiom A.1 is extended by postulates A.1 and A.2. Following this we may state that our
convictions in states of uncertainty in propositions are represented by the set of real numbers,
R, or the subsetR. Furthermore, note that y ∈ (F \ 0), implying that when considering the state
of uncertainty in a proposition given another, then the given proposition is in a known state of
truth — hence the semifield (F \ 0) excludes the false proposition.
Axiom A.2: Sequential continuity
Conviction in states of uncertainty may tend to an assurity.
Axiom A.2 follows from the second desideratum, noting that this may provide a system in which
small changes in the knowledge of a proposition yield small changes in its state of uncertainty.
This axiom may be trivially justified within the context of set theory, since set theory provides
an inherent understanding of ordering in the form of subsets. Propositional logic has no such
structure, therefore the statement made by this axiom requires more care within our framework.
Following axiom A.1 we noted that we now have a means of ordering, in other words, it is
essential to note that ordering only follows once we have established that we are concerned with
our conviction in a state of uncertainty — propositions themselves have no ordering. It is crucial
to note that it is our conviction in a state of uncertainty that enables us to deduce what may
be considered “believable”. In other words, given different constructs of knowledge, states of
uncertainty may have different orderings of plausibility for the same proposition.
Postulate A.3: Ordering in states of uncertainty
For any collection of known propositions y1, y2, . . . , yK our conviction in the state of
∗ Set theory refers to countable unions.
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uncertainty in the proposition x depends on the conditioned information provided by
any given proposition. Therefore, if yk+1 is more descriptive than yk, we assert that
ψ(x | y1) ≤ ψ(x | y2) ≤ · · · ≤ ψ(x | yK)
for any successive increase in conviction given new knowledge/information.
We note that following axiom A.2 and postulate A.3, we are able to make a statement on our
conviction in the state of uncertainty of a proposition given the reverse ordering, meaning that
any successive decrease in our conviction, given information, would eventually tend to reduce
our conviction in the state of uncertainty to zero — making it implausible and not worth any
consideration. This implies consistency according to the third desideratum, and additionally,
implies continuity at zero: ψ(x | y1) → 0.
It is noteworthy to observe that conviction in a state of uncertainty need not depend on the
proposition being the same given different states of knowledge; states of uncertainty may be
ordered even when concerned with different propositions, however the states of uncertainty are
then required to be applicable to the same logical conclusion.
Postulate A.4: Falsities in uncertainty logic
Following postulates A.2 and A.3, and the consequences thereof, we may assert that
the state of uncertainty equivalent to the false proposition is, in fact, 0 ∈ R.
This postulate invokes the third desideratum, while following the logical progression of the afore-
mentioned axioms and postulates. Consequently, we have thatR has a well-defined lower bound
of zero.
Axiom A.3: Decomposibility
For some operator ◦ : R×R→ R, ψ(x, y | z) can be expressed as ψ(x | z)◦ψ(y |x, z).
Axiom A.4: Negation




, for all x ∈ F.
Axiom A.3 follows from the third desideratum, since consistency with propositonal logic implies
that compound logical propositions should decompose into simpler ones. Similarly, axiom A.4
also follows from the third desideratum, and in terms of states of uncertainty any proposition
being mapped to its negation means that knowledge on the conviction of a proposition’s state of
uncertainty implies knowledge on the conviction of the state of uncertainty of it’s negation.
Furthermore, following this reasoning, we may assert the existence of an upper bound on R;
this is evident given that we know of the existence of a lower bound — meaning that there exists
a negation to the falsity (lower bound), namely the truism. We may thus posit the following,
Postulate A.5: Triusm in uncertainty logic
There exists some upper bound in R for ψ, such that the negation of the falsity is that
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upper bound: ψ(0) = t, where t represents the truism in uncertainty logic.
The assertion of this postulate is in accordance with the third desideratum, since certainty has to
comply with (known) truth. Therefore, as the conviction in a state of uncertainty increases to the
point of absolute certainty, then there can only be one correspondence in our state of uncertainty,
namely that of truth (where we have the logical equivalence of t ≡ true).
Intuitively, this postulate is necessary when considering conviction in a state of uncertainty to
be definitive (meaning no uncertainty), i.e. it has to be definite, thus the representation cannot
be that of an infinity, since it is not possible to have infinite conviction on a state of uncertainty
(let alone infinite conviction on anything), bearing in mind that conviction is conditioned on
knowledge/information.
As a result of postulates A.4 and A.5, we have two invariants in uncertainy logic, both of
which correspond to the two invariants of propositional logic: true and false. Furthermore, we
may represent our convictions in these two states of uncertainty as follows,
ψ(x |x) = t (A.1)
ψ(x |x) = 0 (A.2)
The first equation states that our conviction in a state of uncertainty in a proposition, given that
knowledge about the proposition is known (i.e. true), is a certainty (which thus maps to the
logical certainty). The second equation states that our conviction in a state of uncertainty of a
proposition, given that knowledge about the negation of that proposition is known, has to be
false (which thus maps to the logical falsity).
Axiom A.5: Consistency under extension
If (Ω, F, ψ) satisfies axioms A.1 to A.4 as well as postulates A.1 to A.3, then
(Ω× Ω, F⊗ F, ψ ◦ ψ) must as well, meaning that ψ(w, y |x, z) = ψ(w |x) ◦ ψ(y | z)
is consistent.
This axiom also follows from the third desideratum, and since propositional logic is consistent
under extension, we (naturally) expect uncertainty logic to maintain this consistency∗.
Postulate A.6: Structure of uncertainty logic
If (Ω, F, ψ, R, ◦, N) satisfies axioms A.1 to A.5 and postulates A.1 to A.3, then this is
the algebraic structure underlying uncertainty logic.
Having established the underlying structure for the framework of uncertainty logic, we may
now consider investigating some necessary details and properties regarding the nature hereof.
In all cases, consider the conviction in any state of uncertainty to be non-trivial, unless stated
otherwise.
∗ The justification here succeeds that of Terenin and Draper (2017), since consistency under extension follows from
the framework of propositional logic and the desiderata, while they assert it through reasoning of repetitions.
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Lemma A.1: The operation ◦ is monotonic
Proof
For any propositions x or z, the conviction in a state of uncertainty in either proposition, given
information of the form of known logical propositions y1, y2, . . . , yK , is, in accordance with
axiom A.2 (continuity) and postulate A.3 (states may be ordered), confirmed to conform to tran-
sitive ordering.
For any yi in this collection, axiom A.3 (decomposibility) asserts that ψ(x, z | yi) = ψ(x | yi) ◦
ψ(z |x, yi). Given that we have established that ψ(x | y1) ≤ ψ(x | y2) ≤ · · · ≤ ψ(x | yK), the
same ordering, evidently, applies to the quantity ψ(z |x, yi). Hence, it follows that the operation
◦ is monotonic in this setting.
Consider the case in which we apply axiom A.5 (consistency under extension), for which we
have ψ(x, z | yi, yj) = ψ(x | yi) ◦ ψ(z | yj). We have that monotonicity already holds for both,
ψ(x | yi) andψ(z | yj), hence the operation ◦ is alsomonotonic within this setting. Consequently,
we conclude that the operation is monotonic in both arguments.
Lemma A.2: The operation ◦ is cancellative
Cancellativity implies that if ψ(x) ◦ψ(y) = ψ(x) ◦ψ(z) then ψ(y) = ψ(z), and also if
ψ(x) ◦ ψ(y) = ψ(z) ◦ ψ(y) then ψ(x) = ψ(z).
Proof
Consider ψ(x, z | y) = ψ(x | y) ◦ ψ(z |x, y) = ψ(z | y) ◦ ψ(x | z, y), then if our convictions in
the states of uncertainty in x and z are such that ψ(x | y) = ψ(z | y), with ◦ being monotonic, it
implies that, ψ(z |x, y) = ψ(x | z, y). The alternative follows by the same construction.
Lemma A.3: The ◦ operator has a unique identity element e ∈ R
Proof
Concerning convictions any state of uncertainty, the existence of an identity element, e ∈ R,
implies that e ◦ ψ(x) = ψ(x) ◦ e = ψ(x). Suppose that there exists an element f ∈ R such that
f ◦ ψ(x) = ψ(x) ◦ f = ψ(x), then by lemma A.2 (cancellativity) we have that




Lemma A.2 also holds for operating from the left.
Lemma A.4: Associativity
The operation ◦ is associative.
Proof
Logical propositions are associative with respect to AND, however, there are two scenarios in
which we need to consider the operation ◦, the first is that of axiom A.3 (decomposibiliy): be-
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haviour under decomposition, and the second is that of axiom A.5 (consistency under extension):
behaviour under extension.
Part 1: Associativity with respect to decomposition
Invoking axiom A.3, we have that
ψ(w, x, y | z) = ψ
(
w, (x, y) | z
)
= ψ(w | z) ◦ ψ(x, y |w, z)
= ψ(w | z) ◦
(
ψ(x |w, z) ◦ ψ(y |w, x, z)
)
And similarly,
ψ(w, x, y | z) = ψ
(
(w, x), y | z
)
= ψ(w, x | z) ◦ ψ(y |w, x, z)
=
(
ψ(w | z) ◦ ψ(x |w, z)
)
◦ ψ(y |w, x, z)
We may thus conclude that the operation ◦ is associative under decomposition.
Part 2: Associativity with respect to extension
When invoking extension with axiom A.5, we then have,
ψ(w, x, y | z) = ψ
(




(w, x) | z
)
◦ ψ(y |w, x, z)
=
(
ψ(w | z) ◦ ψ(x |w, z)
)
◦ ψ(y |w, x, z)
= ψ(w | z) ◦
(
ψ(x, y |w, z)
)
= ψ(w | z) ◦
(
ψ(x |w) ◦ ψ(y | z)
)
For which the result is inclusive ofψ
(
w, (x, y) | z
)
. This affirms that the operation ◦ is associative
under extension. Furthermore, associativity holds in both cases when extended to collections of
K propositions via the use of recursion in either case.
Lemma A.5: Multiplicativity
The structure (Ω, F, ψ, ◦) is isomorphic to the structure (Ω, F, ψ, ×), where × is
multiplication.
Proof
Aczel (2006, pp. 254–268) details that for any given function that is monotonic, continuous,
cancellative, associative, all within a closed interval, then there exists a continuous function, f ,
such that




We have these properties by lemmas A.1 to A.4, of which a closed interval is asserted by postu-
lates A.4 and A.5 (the existence of a truism and a falsity). By axiom A.3, we have that,
f−1
(
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Following which, we may assert
log
(










































=⇒ ψ(x, y | z) = ψ(x | z)× ψ(y |x, z)
The logarithm being monotonic implies that the composition of the logarithm with ψ is also
monotonic, and the exponential is monotonic as well as bounded above and below within a
closed interval.
Lemma A.6: Normalisation
The structure (Ω, F, ψ, ×, R) is isomorphic to the structure (Ω, F, ψ, ×, [0, 1])
Proof
Postulates A.4 and A.5 (the existence of a truism and a falsity) assert lower and upper bounds on
R, namely R = [0, t]. Suppose [0, 1] ⊆ [0, t], then there exists a ψ(x) such that 1 ≤ ψ(x) ≤ t,
then for the statement ψ(x |x) = t, we have that 1 ≤ t.
Conversely, suppose [0, t] ⊆ [0, 1], then there exists a ψ(x) such that t ≤ ψ(x) ≤ 1. Once
again, consider the statement that ψ(x |x) = t, which implies that t ≤ 1, therefore, it follows
(by contradiction) that t = 1. Following this, we may invoke the Cantor-Bernstein-Schröder
theorem∗ to assert equality between R and [0, 1].
This proof illustrates that there exists some freedom of choice in deciding the magnitude of the
truism, which implies that there exists some arbitrary scale in the definition. We establish t = 1
as a convention based on the representation of the truism in propositional logic, in addition to it
being the simplest scale (least assumptions).
Lemma A.7: Scaling
The structure (Ω, F, ψ, ×, [0, 1], N) is isomorphic to the structure













= 0, which is consistent with our framework of propositional logic and implies
thatN is strictly decreasing. Axiom A.2 (continuity), additionally, implies continuity ofN . Fur-
















, then by self-negation we have that ψ(x) = ψ(y), which
is a contradiction.
∗ Cantor-Bernstein-Schröder theorem states that if a bijection exists between two sets, then the cardinality of those
sets are equal. Here the identity map is a sufficient bijection since we have equal bounds.
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From axiom A.4 we also have thatN maps the entirety ofR to itself, following which we may





= ψ(α). Monotonicity of N implies that this fixed point is unique.
Therefore, there exists a k > 0 such that
ψk(α) = 12
Where k is chosen such that N(12) =
1
2 remains consistent. Jaynes (2003, p. 33) asserts that the
actual value of k is of no importance to provide consistent results within the framework, because
all previous lemmas are satisfied irrespective of k.
Lemma A.8: Additivity of negation
The structure
(




is isomorphic to the structure(
Ω, F, ψ, ×, [0, 1], 1− ψ(x)
)
for any x ∈ F.
Proof
Part 1: Functional equation of N
According to Paris (1995, p. 28) and De Kock (2014, p. 133), and following from lemma A.7
(scaling), let α = ψ(x, y | z) and β = ψ(y | z), we may then examine the negations of α and β as
N(α) = ψ(x, y | z)
N(β) = ψ(y | z) = ψ
(
(x+ y, x+ y) | z
)
We note that the composed α, may be decomposed (according to axiom A.3), which yields
ψ(x, y | z) = ψ(y | z)ψ(x | y, z)
= ψ(y | z)N
(







However, there is an additional factor of consideration, namely the negated proposition. We
therefore consider the alternate case of negation, in which we may assert the following,
ψ(x, y | z) = ψ(x, y, x+ y | z)
= N(α)N
(


















, 0 < α ≤ β ≤ 1 (A.3)
We now have a functional equation which N must satisfy. It is of importance to note that the
arguments to this functional equation are states of uncertainty, i.e. ψ. Bearing in mind that this
equation has two arguments, we introduce the binary operator ∗, such that the operator is an
extension of equation (A.3).
∗ Brouwer’s fixed point theorem states that every continuous function from a closed disc which maps to itself has at
least one fixed point.
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Henceforth let any state of uncertainty have a representation of the formµ ≡ ψ(x), ν ≡ ψ(y),
and υ ≡ ψ(z). With this representation we have a parsable means of employing the defined
operator ∗. We now consider the assignment: N(β) = ν and α = µ, then by taking the negation
of equation (A.3), we have an operation which is defined as








Consequently, we have two functional results originating from the negation of a state of uncer-
tainty, namely equations (A.3) and (A.4), of which the latter is in the form of a newly introduced
binary operator.
Part 2: Commutativity of ∗
By applying the functional given by equation (A.3) to the inner argument of equation (A.4), we
observe that













= ν ∗ µ
Thus, it follows that the operator is commutative.
Part 3: Inversion
Considering the operator to be applied recursively, that is, the operator acting upon two states





















Following which, it appears that the ∗ operator is an (argument-wise) inverse of the functional
equation. Alternatively, letting equation (A.3) act as an argument within the operation of equa-
























Consequently, we have that the ∗ operator is the (argument-wise) inverse of the the functional
given by equation (A.3).
Part 4: Associativity











A.1 Axioms of Uncertainty Logic
In order to test for associativity, we first consider





















Secondly, when comparing this with the alternative, we have that




























From this, we are able to conclude that the operation ∗ is associative.
Part 5: Distributivity
We may expand the inversion equation using aµ, defined as,










and applying the operation of ∗ between aµ and aν, we have








= a(µ ∗ ν)
We have that the operator ∗ is distributive.
Part 6: Induction on ∗
For the fixed point in the states of uncertainty, we know that N(12) =
1
2 . Furthermore, we may
evaluate 12 ∗
1








Let ∗m( 12n ) represent the operation applied to
1




2n ∗ · · · ∗
1
2n .
Then if m = 2n, this notation is (by induction) well defined since it would equal 1 in that case.
Suppose ∗m( 12n ) <
m
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Which contradicts our initial statement. In a similar fashion, the same contradiction occurs when
assuming ∗m( 12n ) >
m








Which completes the inductive process on ∗.
Part 7: Additivity of ∗
Choosing µ = m12n and ν =
m2
2n , we have that




















Thus the binary operation ∗ is, in fact, the binary operation +.
Part 8: Negation principle










= µ+ ν − ν






Lemma A.9: Finite additivity
For any collection ofK mutually exclusive propositions, x1, x2, . . . , xK , the state of











The statement is trivially true for K = 1, with ψ(x1) =
∑1
k=1 ψ(xk) = ψ(x1). Therefore
x2x1
we consider our basis step to be for the caseK = 2. We may consider
Venn diagriams as an illustrative means∗ to reason the state of uncer-
tainty between a disjunction of propositions. When we consider the
state of uncertainty of the disjunction, the result is the state of uncer-
tainty in each proposition as well as two times the state of uncertainty
in the conjunction. However, since we our collection of propositions
∗ A formal proof is given in section 2.2.4 (page 16)
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is mutually exclusive, the conjunction between any propositions is false, therefore the state of
uncertainty in the conjunction yields zero and the result simplifies,




Which is true. Now assume that this lemma holds for all k up to K . We are then required to



















The result thus follows that finite additivity is true for allK .
Lemma A.10: Countable additivity
Extending finite additivity to any non-finite collection of mutually exclusive
















= ψ(x) = 1− ψ(x)
From lemma A.9 (finite additivity) we assert that the state of uncertainty for a limiting case of a





































However, from the assertion of axiom A.2 (sequential continuity) and given lemma A.9 (finite




























From which it follows that countable additivity is satisfied.
A.2 From Uncertainty Logic to Probability Theory
A.2.1 Equivalent Frameworks
Thedesiderata presented in definition 2.1 are related to axioms formulated by Cox (1946, 1961, pp.
4–34), who sought to provide a quantitative framework for inductive reasoning which extends
classical logic, appeals to common sense, and is simultaneously based on simple axioms which
make no large leaps in logic.
Axiom A.6: Cox’s axioms of inductive reasoning
C1 Knowledge of a proposition x implies equivalent knowledge of its converse: x.
C2 Knowledge of the conjunction (x, y) can be quantified from knowledge of a single
proposition, e.g. x, combined with knowledge of the conditional (x | y), provided
that inference on the conditioned proposition, y, is true.
C3 There exists numerical precision on the inferences of propositions, which implies
that if an inference of a proposition x is more believable than that of y, and inference
of y is more believable than that of z, then x is necessarily more believable than z.
Cox (1961) reasoned that the first two axioms are the only∗ necessities needed to provide a plat-
form for the development of a framework for inductive reasoning.
Pólya (1941, p. 2) reasoned that inductive reasoning should be subjective, unlike any forms of
deductive reasoning, asserting that the nature of such a theory should, in principle,measure one’s
degree of belief — contending that reasonable (or reasonably accepted) beliefs may influence our
state of knowledge. Pólya (1941) further reasoned that one’s degree of belief may be subjected
to variation; if evidence yields results on the contrary to one’s expectations, then one’s degree of
belief in a proposition weakens, whereas if evidence yields results in favour of one’s expectations,
then one’s degree of belief strengthens.
Cox (1961, pp. 1, 94) asserted that inductive reasoning is a form of probable inference (given an
appropriate premise) and that it is relative; one person may accept an inferential conclusion as
more or less credible than another person may — even though it is the same conclusion, meaning
that it is subjective (and grounded in prior knowledge/evidence on what is being inferred). In
addition, Cox (1961) stated that in any subjective sense, one’s conclusions may be subject to
change by new experience, thus probable inference in a hypothesis may gradually become more
∗ Cox (1961, p. 34) does not state the third axiom formally, reasoning that numerical precision may often be included
without second thought and that it cannot be neglected.
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probable provided that favourable instances of inference increase or otherwise decrease with
contrary instances.
In both cases, that of Cox (1961) and Pólya (1941), their qualitative foundations were fulfilled
by the calculus of probabilities, and both posited that probability theory succeeds the frequency
formalism. Cox (1946, 1961) went one step further in quantifying the formalism of a framework
for inductive reasoning which extends propositional logic without making any reference to fre-
quencies (and games of chance), and in turn, resulted in the following,
Theorem A.1 Cox’s Theorem
Any subjective theory of reasoning which extends classical logic is isomorphic to the
calculus of probabilities.
Interestingly, just as Cox’s axioms lead to the calculus of probabilities, they may also be deduced
in reverse: from within the framework of probabilities. As a result, Cox’s axioms behave as a
fail-safe which maintain consistency with any alternative formalism, even if these axioms are
not incorporated by design (Skilling 2005, p. 4). An example of an alternative formalism is
Kolmogorov’s formalism of probability theory — which, from the calculus of probabilities, lead
to Cox’s axioms, thus asserting logical equivalence (Jaynes 2003, p. 652; Skilling 2005, p. 5).
When considering our formalism of uncertainty logic, we note that it is, on the premise of our
desiderata, consistent with Cox’s axioms. It is now of interest to show that this framework is
equivalent to that of probability theory. Before doing so, it is worthwhile to first reconcile con-
ceptual differences within the two frameworks (without making any assumption of equivalence).
The subjectivity in uncertainty logic is contained within the definition of ψ(x): our conviction in
the state of uncertainty in the proposition x, which was described as the level of how convincing
a state of uncertainty may be. Pólya (1941) and Jaynes (2003) refer to probability as a degree of
belief and this measure is exactly how convinced one is by any given probability, in other words,
one’s conviction.
What Cox (1961) and Jaynes (2003) respectively refer to as (the observer’s) information and
prior knowledge, are both considered to be one’s knowledge on a known proposition (recall: a
true statement) in uncertainty logic, which we denote by κ, and as ψ(x | y, κ) in a conditioned
state of uncertainty (where knowledge on y is true). Knowledge naturally influences conviction
and an initial conviction in a state of uncertainty is premised on initial knowledge thereof.
The advantage of referring to the terms as defined by uncertainty logic is that it provides a less
abstract form of reasoning about these quantities, while maintaining consistency and meaning.
It is for more than merely aesthetic reasons that we shall continue the use of these quantities
as defined by uncertainty logic; “knowledge” cannot be abstracted from an observer in the same
way that “information” can. Moreover, preferring “conviction” more so than “degree of belief”,
since conviction is inherently more subjective than belief; one’s belief can subsist beyond death,
whereas one’s conviction cannot.
At this point our formalism of uncertainty logic appears to be consistent with the philosophies of
Pólya (1941), Cox (1961), and Jaynes (2003). We now give consideration to an alternative formu-
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lation of the theory of probability — that of Kolmogorov (1956), who independently provided an
axiomatic foundation for the theory. Kolmogorov (1956, pp. 1–16) decided upon his axioms as
such based on simplicity
(
much like Cox (1946)
)
and phrased it in the framework of set theory,
Axiom A.7: Kolmogorov’s axioms of probability theory
K1 F is a field which contains the set Ω, a collection of elementary elements, ei, with
subsets ωk.
I The complement for any setωk with respect toΩ is contained inF: Ω−ωk ∈ F.
II F is closed under countable unions, meaning that if countably many ωk are in
F, then their union is also in F.
K2 There exists a measure p on F where
I A non-negative real number is assigned to each set ωk in F as p(ωk), which
we call the probability of ωk.
II p is normalised such that p(Ω) = 1.





k p(ωk) is their union.
K3 If a decreasing sequence ω1 ⊇ ω2 ⊇ · · · ⊇ ωK ⊇ · · · tends to the empty set, then
lim p(ωk) → 0 as k → ∞.
Axiom K1 essentially asserts that F is a field with σ-algebra on Ω. Kolmogorov (1956, p. 3)
asserted that axioms K1 and K2 are valid and consistent for all finite systems of probability, and
when considering such finite systems, axiom K2.III refers to finite additivity.
Kolmogorov (1956, p. 14) extended his formalism to encompass infinite sets (noting that ax-
ioms K1 and K2 remain valid), upon which continuity at zero followed in the form of axiom K3.
Interestingly, this continuity was reasoned to be valid for both finite and infinite systems, even
though asserted from the onset of infinite sets. For infinite sets, additivity in axiom K2.III refers
to countable additivity.
We are able to rephrase these axioms in terms of propositions, and in doing so, we have that Ω
is a collection of propositions (w, x, y, etc.), where all ωk correspond to propositions with the
inclusion of the core operators (NOT, AND, OR) in our framework∗. With a propositional rephrase
of these axiom, we are able to draw parallels to uncertainty logic.
Our formalism of uncertainty logic satisfies axiom K1 by postulate A.1 (logical propositions
exist within a field, F). Axiom K2 is in accordance with postulate A.2 (there exists a measure
on F), where non-negativity in axiom K2.I follows from postulate A.4 (falsity in uncertainty
logic) defining a lower bound, following which axiom K2.II follows from postulate A.5 (truism
in uncertainty logic), which is justified by lemma A.6 (normalisation) with the assertion that the
truism in uncertainty logic may be defined (up to an arbitrary scale) as ψ(x |x) = 1.







k ψ(xk). Axiom K3 follows from postulate A.3 (ordering in states of
uncertainty) and it is worth noting that we do not need to invoke a collection of infinite propo-
∗ With note that the notion of subsets is not inherent to propositional logic.
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sitions to reach this conclusion. In agreement with Jaynes (2003, p. 653), we are fundamentally
concerned with an infinite sequence of different states of knowledge, which may be about a single
proposition, as was illustrated in postulate A.3. It follows that uncertainty logic is also consistent
with Kolmogorov’s philosophy.
We may now reflect on how Cox’s axioms are indeed simpler in nature than those of Kol-
mogorov’s axioms; Cox’s axioms were formulated as a basis for reasoning which resulted in
probability theory, while Kolmogorov’s axiom were framed as the basis for probability theory
and make no reference to knowledge/information. Even though their results are equivalent,
they approached it from different directions, which allowed Cox to make less preliminary as-
sumptions. This is why Cox’s axioms are appropriately chosen as the basis of our desiderata,
moreover now that we have asserted uncertainty logic through Kolmogorov’s axioms via Cox’s
theorem — showing that their independent formalisms compliment each other.
What we have achieved by our formalism of uncertainty logic was to find a middle ground
between the formalisms of Cox and Kolmogorov. The goal was not to be rigorous simply for the
sake of rigour, but rather to show that it can be done in this way∗. We may thus give credence to
probability theory being a fully functional framework of reasoning.
A.2.2 Logic of Probabilities
Having established consistency between uncertainty logic and probability theory, wemay hence-
forth express our conviction in a state of uncertainty in a proposition as the probability of that
proposition: ψ(x) ≡ p(x), in other words probability meaures (or evaluates) our conviction.
From this point onward uncertainty logic may be known as probability theory.
∗∗∗
What is a probability?
Instinctively, we may consider probability to be synonymous with chance. Offhand, we may con-
sider this chance to be the possibility of some event happening. The assignment of this possibility
would then be the probability of the said event actually happening. In other words, probability
may be considered to be an indicator of how probable an occurrence of a possible event may
be. If we consider this in practise, then we may, for example, flip a coin once and (instinctively)
assign probabilities of 12 for both heads and tails.
Example A.1 States of Uncertainty: The Glass Urn
A transparent (!) glass urn contains three balls: one blue, one green, and one red. We
may represent the state of each ball with the following propositions,
• r ≡ the red ball is inside the urn
• g ≡ the green ball is inside the urn
• b ≡ the blue ball is inside the urn
∗ Jaynes (2003, p. 674) remarked that authors often make the mistake of confusing mathematical rigour with “correct-
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If raising the question “Is the red ball inside the urn?”, we may evaluate this question
using standard propositional logic: r ≡ 0, meaning r ≡ 1, i.e. the red ball is indeed inside
the urn. However, since our third desideratum imposes consistency with propositional
logic, we expect our state of uncertainty in the proposition r to reflect the same, i.e.
ψ(r) = 0. To make this statement more succinct, we consider our conviction in the state
of uncertainty to be conditioned on the knowledge we have at hand, being that we know
the urn contains all balls, therefore
ψ(r | the urn contains all balls) ≡ 1
Here we introduced the proposition “the urn contains all the balls” which we considered
as “our knowledge (or information)” — this is also consistent with our third desideratum
which states that all (necessarily relevent) propositions should be considered.
To reiterate, note that propositional statements have two states of certainty: true and
false. As such, our conviction in states of uncertainty in any proposition should reflect
these two states of certainty when knowledge affects our conviction in states of uncer-
tainty to become certain.
If we are to select a ball from the urn while closing our eyes (thus make a random selec-
tion), we may evaluate our conviction in the state of uncertainty in selecting a particular
ball by first proposing the propositions of selecting a ball,
• R ≡ the red ball is selected
• G ≡ the green ball is selected
• B ≡ the blue ball is selected
Then we may evaluate these propositions given our knowledge at hand, that all balls are
contained within the urn,
ψ(R | the urn contains all balls) = 13
ψ(G | the urn contains all balls) = 13
ψ(B | the urn contains all balls) = 13
Suppose the red ball has been selected and the urn now contains two balls, how do we
evaluate our conviction in the state of uncertainty when next selecting a green ball?
We can reason that the urn contains one green ball and two balls total, therefore
ψ(G |R), the state of uncertainty in selecting a green ball given that a red ball has been
selected is 12 . Of course, our state of uncertainty in then selecting a blue ball is a cer-
tainty, since the urn contains one remaining ball which we know to be blue, meaning
ψ(B |G,R) = 1.
Firstly, note that we still refer to state of uncertainty in a proposition in this example, knowing
that it may be exchanged with probability of a proposition, with ψ 7→ p. Secondly, we reiterate
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that conditioned knowledge (be it a proposition or other) is in a state of truth; it is known to us.
Lastly, our (conditioned) state of knowledge influences our conviction and this becomes apparent
when changes in our state of knowledge bring forth changes in our conviction.
To address the arbitrariness in the scale of how the truism is defined, we give it consideration
in terms of lemma A.8 (additivity of negation) and axiom A.3 (decomposibility). If certainty is
represented as ψ(x |x) = t (where t may be anything), then lemma A.8 and axiom A.3 have to
be scaled accordingly,




= ψ(x | y, κ)ψ(y |κ)
To put this into perspective, let t = 100 and then reconsider example A.1. Let u ≡ “the urn
contains all balls”, then probability for each ball being inside the urn while u is true, is given by
ψ(R |u) = ψ(G |u) = ψ(B |u) = 33.3̇
Which sums to 100 (i.e. t). The probability for selecting a green ball after the red ball has been
selected is p(G |R) = 50, for which it then follows that the probability of selecting a blue ball
(given the previous two selections) is p(B |G,R) = 100. These two quantities can be restated





= ψ(B |G,R)ψ(G |R)
And knowing that the right hand side is equal to 5000, it is not a far reach to say that the left
hand side has to be scaled by 100, because the joint probability (before decomposed) has to be
50 to maintain consistency with the lemma A.8! So the left hand side of this decomposition is
scaled as 100ψ(B,G |R). This rescale is the reinterpretation of probabilities as percentages.
Even more generally, probabilities may be rescaled by any monotonic function, but then con-
sistency requires that the sum and product rules are adapted accordingly, otherwise the content
of the theory changes (Jaynes 2003, p. 652). It is evident that the choice of t = 1 is indeed the
quintessential choice of scale.
∗ ∗ ∗
Can probabilities be unrelated to events of chance?
We have established probability to be a measure of our conviction, and our convictions need not
be weighed according to a numerical assignment (as illustrated in example A.1); it may very well
be weighed based on indeterminate assignments.
One example hereof is embedded in human experience, which we consider from RiRi’s perspec-
tive: RiRi was acquainted with two people, Jay and JamJam. After becoming familiar enough to
form bonds of friendship, RiRi felt both of them to be trustworthy. RiRi’s state of knowledge was
based on his perception of trustworthiness: s ≡ the person is trustworthy. Let a and b be Jay’s
and JamJam’s respective impressions on RiRi, meaning that p(s | a) and p(s | b) determined his
conviction to trust or distrust either of them.
A breach in trust by Jay meant that perception of Jay’s trustworthiness declined, thus p(s | a)
resulted in lesser conviction in Jay’s trustworthiness. Improved relations with JamJam resulted
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in an improved perception of JamJam’s trustworthiness, which meant that p(s | b) resulted in
greater conviction in JamJam’s trustworthiness. Of course, any repeated breach of trust would
yield an even lesser conviction while a strengthening bond would yield a stronger conviction
(corresponding to negative/positive changes in states of knowledge).
Even without numerical assignments we may reach conclusions on indeterminate probabilistc




TheTheory of Hypergeometric Functions
B.1 Introduction
Hypergeometric functions, also known as hypergeometric series, historically arose during a
study of quadrature conducted by John Wallis during the 17th century, however it was not for-
malised until it was later discovered and studied by Euler. Eventually, the hypergeometric func-
tion matured into its modern form under the helm of Gauss (as well as Pfaf), where it was also
shown to be a solution to certain sescond order differential equations (Dutka 1984). The study in
differential equations was continued by Riemann and Kummer, where Riemann observed that a
characterisation for second-order differential equations with three regular singularities produced
a powerful, efficient technique for obtaining hypergeometric functions (Andrews et al. 1999, p.
61).
Hypergeometric functions are also ubiquitous in the physical sciences; Bessel functions, or-
thogonal polynomials (e.g. associated Legendre polynomials or Jacobi polynomials), etc. can all
be represented in terms of hypergeometric functions.
Hypergeometric functions are of the most important special functions in mathematics. It has
become essential in the study of special functions due to its robust ability to generalise special
functions across many different families. In essence, the hypergeometric function developed into
a catch-all function for special functions. In this respect, it was surpassed by Meijer G-functions,
of which hypergeometric functions are also a special case. Althoughmentioned, but not detailed,
we are forced to consider one important question: what is a special function?
Special functions are functions that are ubiquitous in several (if not all) fields that make use of
mathematical techniques to solve problems. For example, the trigonometric functions sinx, cosx
and tanx arise in all contexts, from solutions to differential equations describing waves, to ap-
proximations of functions (or irrational numbers), and the like.
However, it is not only the ubiquity that make these type of functions special. Special functions
generally have representations which are defined by power series, (definite, indefinite, contour)
integrals, generating functions, infinite products, orthogonal polynomials, etc. The aforemen-







Special functions usually have series representations (in addition to other representations, if de-
fined as such), and are analytic in their domains, but more importantly may be classed and de-
fined by hypergeometric functions, in other words, most special functions share an underlying
structure which is defined by hypergeometric functions — which is what makes hypergeometric
functions as special and powerful as they are.








TheTheory of Hypergeometric Functions
Within a geometric progression, the ratio between successive terms is a constant term known
as the common ratio, namely r. To clarify this statement, for any geometric series
∑
k tk, the
ratio tk+1tk = r. The behaviour of the series depends on this term, for example if |r| < 1, then the
series converges. The extension of the geometric series is known as the hypergeometric series,
where the ratio between successive terms is no longer a constant, but a rational function of k.















∣∣∣∣ −z2) = 12z log(1 + z1− z) (B.2)
The generalised hypergeometric function is a power series in z with p parameters in the numer-
ator and q parameters in the denominator, and it is defined in terms of rising powers,
pFq
(
a1, a2, . . . , ap
b1, b2, . . . , bq




2 · · · akp
bk1 b
k






The parameters in the numerator, ai, are known as upper parameters while the parameters in the
denominator, bi, are known as lower parameters, and the quantity z is known as the argument.
None of the lower parameters may be negative or zero, otherwise we encounter division by zero
(Graham et al. 1989, p. 205).
As previously mentioned, many functions appear as special cases of equation (B.3), for ex-




particular a and z. Additionally, since 1k = k!, we may characterise the previously mentioned




∣∣∣∣ z) = ∑
k⩾ 0
zk
Having returned to the geometric series, we are reminded once more about the aforementioned
characteristic criterion of a geometric series: successive terms have a constant ratio. Expanding
upon this, for any hepergeometric series given by equation (B.3),
∑




(k + a1)(k + a2) · · · (k + ap)




Equation (B.4) presents the ratio as a rational function of k, in other words, hypergeometric series
are precisely those series with a first term of unity (i.e. t0 = 1) and a ratio of successive terms that
is a rational function of k (i.e. a ratio of polynomials in k). If, in certain cases, the denominator
does not contain the term (k + 1), it is useful to include this term in both the numerator and
denominator, to compensate for the factorial term in the definition (Graham et al. 1989, p. 208).
Note that the parameters of equation (B.3) appear explicitly in this ratio.
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B.2 Generalised Hypergeometric Functions
To familiarise ourselves with the aforementioned content, we may examine it in practise with
the following example.
Example B.1 Ubiquity of Hypergeometric Functions
Consider the indefinite integral of secx, one that most encounter within their first
course in calculus. Traditionally, we would multiply by a clever fraction and employ
u-substitution. While this technique is remarkable, it is, nevertheless, merely a trick.
Here we consider the manner in which it is traditionally solved in such courses to be
rather unsatisfactory. Alternatively, we opt for a solution which involves no trickery.∫
dx secx = 2
∫










































Ignoring the constant of integration for the time being, we observe that we have an in-
finite series, and we may therefore determine the ratio of successive terms in order to























Note that, as stated, the parameters of the hypergeometric appear explicitly in this ratio.
Therefore, we have that∫




∣∣∣∣ −e2ix)+ c (B.6)
= − log
∣∣∣∣1 + ieix1− ieix
∣∣∣∣+ c
= log






TheTheory of Hypergeometric Functions
This example takes the unconventional approach to illustrate the practicality of utilising hyperge-
ometric functions. In doing so, it enables us to do mathematicswithout involving clever trickery.
In other words, we may opt for an approach involving greater dependence on logic and intuition
when facing problems such as these. This does, unfortunately, come with a costly caveat, being
that one is required to have a much greater background in a broader body of work∗. In addition
to this, example B.1 illustrates why it is so common for mathematica to produce hypergeometric
results for integrals.
B.2.1 Hypergeometric Functions of Finite Series
Anegative integer as upper parameter causes the infinite series to become finite, since (−a)k = 0






















zk = (1− z)a (B.7)
which is merely the binomial theorem and known to be finite. Suppose we consider the Chu-
















This is “well-defined” in the sense that it has a determinate closed form. If, however, we consider
the alternating Chu-Vandermonde convolution, there exists no well-known, succinct close form












































Which holds for t ≥ n. With equation (B.10), we have thus determined a closed form solution for
the alternating Chu-Vandermonde convolution. It is worth noting that equation (B.10) acquires
the coefficient since the first term of the hypergeometric series is 1.
B.3 Prominent Hypergeometric Functions
Literature (by and large) tend to focus on these functions. Their prominence is historically per-
vasive, due to their versatility and prevalence in mathematics and other fields.
∗ As seen in example B.1, where it was required to know Euler’s identity, the binomial expansion for negative powers
along with binomial identities, etc.
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B.3 Prominent Hypergeometric Functions
B.3.1 Gauss’ Hypergeometric Function
When involved with hypergeometric functions, Gauss’ hypergeometric function is considered to
be the hypergeometric function. This is arguably the most important hypergeometric function,
while at the same time, being the most prominently studied.
The following differential equation was discovered by Euler, then investigated by both him
and Pfaff, and it was Gauss that eventually provided remarkable insight into the characteristics






c− (a+ b+ 1)
)dw
dz
− abw = 0
This equation is known as Euler’s differential equation. Gauss provided the following solution,












Additionally, an independent solution is also given by z1−c2F1(a + 1 − c, b + 1 − c; 2 − c | z).





∣∣∣∣ z) = 1B(b, c− b)
∫ 1
0
dxxb−1(1− x)c−b−1(1− zx)a (B.12)
The primary reason that Gauss’ hypergeometric maintains a higher status is due to the versatility
of the function depending on the parameters, being able to encompass many special functions (as
encountered first in example B.1), as well as generalising many famous mathematical relations,










∣∣∣∣ −z2) = 1z tan−1(z)
B.3.2 Confluent Hypergeometric Functions







− aw = 0












This solution is known as the confluent hypergeometric function of the first kind. Equation (B.13)





∣∣∣∣ z) = Γ(b)Γ(a)Γ(b− a)
∫ 1
0
dt ta−1(1− t)b−a−1 ezt (B.14)
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TheTheory of Hypergeometric Functions
Since Kummer’s differential equation is of second-order, there exists another linearly indepen-
dent solution, which is z1−b 1F1(a+1−b; 2−b | z) function. Tricomi introduced a superposition




∣∣ z) = Γ(1− b)










This is also a solution to Kummer’s differential equation and it is known as the confluent hyper-








dt ta−1(1 + t)b−a−1 e−zt (B.16)
Confluent hypegeometric functions are known as such because they are a confluence of two
singularities, given that they arise from limiting Gauss’ hypergeometric function: where the
singularity at b tends to that of infinity (Andrews et al. 1999, p. 188; Bateman et al. 1953, p. 262).
























Regarding limiting cases, the 0F1 function is also known as the confluent hypergeometric limiting










B.4 Bivariate Hypergeometric Functions
This section primarily aims to bring the following generalisations to the reader’s attention∗, since
these are natural extensions to the previously encountered functions.
There are two primary classes of bivariate hypergeometric functions, the first class generalises
Gauss’ hypergeometric function to two variables, while the second class generalises the confluent
hypergeometric function of the first kind.
Since bivariate hypergeometric series are double series, it is important to note that we now have
composite terms between the two series, such as am+n, as well as singular terms bm1 and b
n
2 . As





























∗ For further reading, consult Bateman et al. (1953, §5.7).
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B.5 Differentiation of Hypergeometric Functions
Here g and h are any arbitrary bivariate hypergeometric functions. Our first adjustment to cur-
rently known convention is the addition of a subscript to each non-composite parameter, since
it provides an indication to its associated series. Secondly, we separate the composite terms with
a colon, with this parameter also being position sensitive, thus indicating whether it is a lower
or upper parameter. The parameters to the right of the colon follow our previously established
convention.
B.4.1 Appell Functions
In 1880 Appell developed four series which are analogous to Gauss’ hypergeometric (Bateman


































Humbert introduced seven bivariate functions in 1926, which extend the confluent hypergeo-






























The Appell functions are part of fourteen complete series, while the Humbert functions are part
of twenty confluent series. The complete list is known as Horn’s list of bivariate hypergeometric
functions (Bateman et al. 1953, p. 224).
B.5 Differentiation of Hypergeometric Functions
Identities B.2
xm+n = xm(x+m)n = xn(x+ n)m (B.23)
Differentiation is probably best digested via an example. As such, when we differentiate equa-
tion (B.3), we may consider the following example.
Example B.2 Differentiating the Generalised Hypergeometric
Note that when differentiating a series, we need to assure ourselves that the first term is
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a1, . . . , ap
b1, . . . , bq




2 · · · akp
bk1 b
k






Here we are required to adjust the index to maintain consistency, therefore the series







2 · · · ak+1p
bk+11 b
k+1










k a2(a2 + 1)
k · · · ap(ap + 1)k





a1 · · · ap
b1 · · · bq p
Fq
(
a1 + 1, . . . , ap + 1
b1 + 1, . . . , bq + 1
∣∣∣∣ z)
If we take the second derivative, then wemay note that the same would happen for the translated
parameters, i.e. the current termwould appear as a coefficient and the parameters of the function





a1, . . . , ap
b1, . . . , bq
∣∣∣∣ z) = an1 · · · anp





a1 + n, . . . , ap + n
b1 + n, . . . , bq + n
∣∣∣∣ z) (B.24)
We observe that differentiation acts upon all parameters, however, it is possible to translate only
a single parameter, meaning that the operation acts upon one particular parameter, in that case
we may consider this operator, (ϑ+ai)with ϑ = z ddz (Graham et al. 1989, p. 219). This operator
is known as the homogeneity operator, and allows us to manipulate the function as follows,
(ϑ+ a1) pFq
(
a1, . . . , ap
b1, . . . , bq





2 · · · akp
bk1 b
k










k ak2 · · · akp
bk1 b
k








a1 + 1, . . . , ap
b1, . . . , bq
∣∣∣∣ z)
Higher derivatives follow in the same way as before, except acting only on the particular param-
eter. In order to generalise this to higher order derivatives affecting any upper parameter, we
update the previous operator: (ϑ + si)j , here j is the order of the differential operator, i is the




a1, . . . , ap
b1, . . . , bq
∣∣∣∣ z) = ani pFq(a1, . . . , ai + n, . . . , apb1, . . . , bq
∣∣∣∣ z) (B.25)
Note that this acts only upon the upper parameters. In order to apply this to the lower parameters,




translate in the numerator, while our lower parameters appear in the denominator. As such,
we consider equation (B.23) given in identities B.2, by taking the ratio of the two equivalent




We are therefore able to extend this operation to the lower parameters, with a minor adjust-
ment to the differential operator: (ϑ+ ti)j , where i and j are the same as before and ti = bi − j.
From which it follows,
(ϑ+ ti)n pFq
(
a1, . . . , ap
b1, . . . , bq
∣∣∣∣ z) = (bi − 1)n pFq( a1, . . . , apb1, . . . , bi − n, . . . , bq
∣∣∣∣ z) (B.26)

































c1, c2 + n
∣∣∣∣ x, y)
B.6 Hypergeometric Summands
The generalised hypergeometric series has no upper bound, however, in practise, we may not
necessarily encounter such unbounded summations. Therefore, it is of interest to consider pos-
sibilities where the series may have a definite upper bound. We start by defining hypergeometric




a1, a2, . . . , ap
b1, b2, . . . , bq
∣∣∣∣ z) = K∑
k=0
ak1 · · · akp








a1, a2, . . . , ap




aK1 · · · aKp




The series given by equation (B.27) is said to be summable in hypergeometric terms, with con-




a1, a2, . . . , ap
b1, b2, . . . , bq




such that A1, . . . , Am;B1, . . . , Bn; and Z exist (Graham et al. 1989, p. 224). Let the term of the
mFn
K partial hypergeometric function containing these parameters be Ck.
The partial hypergeometric series may be evaluated as such if the ratio of successive terms









With q and r subject to
(k + α)
∣∣ q(k) and (k + β) ∣∣ r(k) (B.30)
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Where α−β < 0 ∈ Z. Divisibility means that the quotient are still a polynomials (Graham et al.
1989, p. 225). The conditions specified in equation (B.30) may be achieved by setting p(k) = 1,
for the time being, then q(k) = (k+ a1) · · · (k+ ap)z and r(k) = (k+ b1− 1) · · · (k+ bq − 1)k.
If q and r have factors (k+ α) and (k+ β) such that α− β = N > 0, then they may be divided
out and reconstruct p(k) such that the condition holds:
p(k)(k + α− 1)N = p(k)(k + α− 1)(k + α− 2) · · · (k + β + 1)
By evaluating the definite sum given by equation equation (B.28), we are interested in finding a
hypergeometric term Ck, such that
ck = wCk+1 − wCk (B.31)
The hypergeometric term of interest may also be represented in terms of polynomials, in a similar





Here s is conditioned from equations (B.29) and (B.31), leading to
p(k) = q(k)s(k + 1)− r(k)s(k) (B.33)
For the degree t polynomial s(k) = αtkt + αt−1kt−1 + · · · + α0, with αt 6= 0, let Q(k) =
q(k) − r(k) = βkv−1 + · · · and R(k) = q(k) + r(k) = γkv + · · · , with γ 6= 0, then the
recurrence in equation (B.33) may be rewritten as
2p(k) = Q(k)
(




s(k + 1)− s(k)
)
(B.34)
= (2βαt + γtαt)k
t+v−1 + · · ·
This enables the following two constraints: either 2β+ γt 6= 0 and t = deg(p)− deg(R)+ 1, or
2β+ γt = 0 and t > deg(p)−deg(R)+1 (Graham et al. 1989, p. 226). This procedure is known
as Gosper’s method.
Example B.3 Sum-thing Old and Sum-thing New
Students occasionally encounter popular series such as the sum of n integers or the sum
of n square integers. Most commonly, a closed form for these (finite) series is determined




Wewill, as is expected, employ our new knowledge in order to find a closed form for this











Here we assert that p(k) = k2 and r(k) = q(k) = 1. The condition on s given by
equation (B.34) suggests that s is of degree 3: s(k) = α3k3 + α2k2 + α1k1. In addition
to this, we also have that p is the finite difference of s:
p(k) = s(k + 1)− s(k) = ∆+s(k)
Meaning that the calculation reduces to the determination of coefficients,
∆+s(k) = 3α3k
2 + (3α3 + 2α2)k + (α3 + α2 + α1)
=⇒ α3 = 13 , α2 = −
1
2 , α1 =
1
6
For which we have the closed form for theK th term,





= 16k(2k − 1)(k − 1)
In certain cases, the partial hypergeometric series may be solved and expressed in the same way




Hyperspherical Variables and Sampling



















∣∣∣∣ 1) = Γ(c− a− b)Γ(c)Γ(c− a)Γ(c− b) (C.3)
The Jacobian’s determinant serves as preserving area between coordinate transformations, and
it is equivalent to the surface element of a parametrised surface. This equivalence can be asserted
through the concept of the surface integral for any parametric function, f(x). Consider the case
with f(x, y, z), then the surface integral is given by∫∫
S








Where r(u, v) =
(
x(u, v), y(u, v), z(u, v)
)
and ru = (∂ux, ∂uy, ∂uz) and rv = (∂vx, ∂vy, ∂vz).
The norm of the cross product of these vectors, ‖ru × rv‖, is known as the surface element







dA ‖ru × rv‖ (C.4)
And we have a representation for the surface area of an arbitrarily parametrised quantity. Con-
sider the above, but in terms of the wedge product and differential forms,



























= ‖ru × rv‖ (du ∧ dv) (C.5)
The surface element arises naturally. Here we observe that the Jacobian and the surface element
are one and the same! This extends without loss of generality to arbitrary coordinates,
dx1 ∧ · · · ∧ dxK = |JK | du1 ∧ · · · ∧ duK (C.6)
For this we conclude that the surface area of a parametric function, f , of K-dimensions is the
(K−1)-dimensional integral over the regionD where theK−1 coordinates (u1, u2, . . . , uK−1)
span the surface of f .




































For the integral in equation (C.7), let m represent arbitrary k, then we only need to consider
solving the 1-dimensional integral, since the product essentially consists of the same, identical
1-dimensional integrals for various k.∫ π
0













































is zero for all even values ofm in equation (C.9), and −2 for all odd
values, therefore we conditionm to be of the form m = 2n + 1. Let tℓ represent the summand























(ℓ− 2n− 1)(ℓ− n− 12)
ℓ− n+ 12
(C.11)
This allows us to represent the sum in equation (C.10) as a hypergeometric function:
2n+1∑
ℓ=0
tℓ = t0 2F1
(








−2n− 1, −n− 12
−n+ 12
∣∣∣∣ 1)
For which we now have the solution of the integral to be given by,∫ π
0







−2n− 1, −n− 12
−n+ 12
∣∣∣∣ 1). (C.12)
The hypergeometric function may be simplified via identities C.1, which yields
2F1
(
−2n− 1, −n− 12
−n+ 12
∣∣∣∣ 1) = Γ
(














































Hyperspherical Variables and Sampling
Resulting in the solution of the integral in equation (C.7), withm = 2n+ 1, to be∫ π
0

























C.2 Random Sampling in Spherical Space
Suppose we have any vector in Cartesian space, x, that points to the surface of a (hyper)cube.
For any such cube, we can constrain vectors such as x to the surface of a sphere of radius r at
the same origin. In performing such a projection, we are constraining the norm of x to be equal





Here the variables y are the result of constraining the norm of x to the radius, so the new vari-
ables result in ‖y‖ = r. This is essentially the projection of x onto y, projy x, and given that
they are parallel, it merely reduces to a constraint on the norm of x, which constrains it to the
surface of a sphere of radius r. In essence, this is a projection onto a spherical surface.
We may conceptualise this in terms of sampling. Supposing that x is a random vector in
Cartesian space, then we may consider samples which are sampled on a spherical surface to be
constrained via equation (C.16) (Von der Linden et al. 2014, p. 519). In that case, we project x
onto the sphere of radius r,
p(y |κ) =
∫










































ds sK−1 p(sy) (C.18)
The PDF p(sy) may then be chosen for whichever sample of random variables may be desired,
which will be sampled in spherical space and on the surface of a sphere.
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C.2 Random Sampling in Spherical Space
C.2.1 Uniform Variables on a Spherical Surface
A natural assumption may be to consider sampling from a uniform distribution and constraining
it to the surface of a sphere. In that case, we consider p(sy) = U(syk,−1, 1), resulting in




























δ(r − ‖y‖)M−K (C.19)
HereM = maxk(xk). This is the result when sampling uniform random variables on the surface
of a hypercube and constraining it to the surface of a sphere — simply standard uniform random
variables projected onto the surface of the K-dimensional hypersphere. The result is such that,
if considering the unit sphere, then if x points along a coordinate axis we have thatM−K = 1
and if it has equal contributions in all coordinates we have thatM−K = KK/2 , which implies that
samples will be sparse if the vector points perpendicular to one of the faces of the hypercube,
while more densely populated if the vector points towards the corners of the hypercube (Von
der Linden et al. 2014, p. 521)










(i) Samples projected onto the xy-plane.










(ii) Histogram of samples along the x-axis.
Figure C.1: 7500 samples from the uniform distribution on the 3-dimensional unit sphere. Colour coding
indicates different contours of latitude on the sphere.
We can clearly observe that the samples are not uniformly distributed on the sphere, meaning
that a uniform distribution does not maintain spherical symmetry and is thus not rotationally
symmetric in spherical space.
C.2.2 Gaussian Variables on a Spherical Surface
We now want to obtain a spherically symmetric solution to equation (C.18), in doing so we
would maintain the principle of indifference in spherical space which in turn would lead to an
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. In projection onto the sphere we have





































Here we see that the normalisation is given by the surface area of the hypersphere, moreover we
note that symmetry can be observed,










(i) Samples projected onto the xy-plane.







(ii) Histogram of samples along the x-axis.
Figure C.2: 7500 Gaussian distributed samples on the 3-dimensional unit sphere. Colour coding indicates
different contours of latitude on the sphere.
The Gaussian samples are indeed unform on the surface of a hypersphere. For this we conclude
that the Gaussian distribution can be chosen as an unbiased prior in spherical space.
C.2.3 Symmetric Samples Within a Sphere
We may now take this one step further moving from the surface of the sphere to within the
sphere. Traversing the volume of the sphere implies moving along the radius and maintaining
spherical symmetry while considering the spherical volume means that the distribution has to
be uniform at all points along the radius. This means to account for the variation of volume near
the equator in comparison to variation near the poles.















C.2 Random Sampling in Spherical Space
And we can note that the volume grows as rK with the radius. Note that the volume is more
concentrated closer to the surface compared to the centre and longer radii essentially require
more samples∗.












































Now, in order to maintain spherical symmetry in the hyperspherical volume, i.e. uniform sam-
pling in terms of radii, we can think in terms of layers of spheres with respect to their surfaces. If
a random variable is uniform on the surface of theK-dimensional sphere, then it will be uniform
within the volume of the (K−1)-dimensional sphere†, and to sample uniformly in terms of radii,
we are thus required to have a prior on r which scales as p(r) ∝ rK−1 (Von der Linden et al.
2014, p. 522).
The results that we have obtained in equation (C.22) are more meaningful than they currently
appear to be, and these results are explored in terms of modelling in Chapter 5 Spherical Sym-
metry (page 41).
∗ This can be thought of as considering the amount of points needed to fill the spherical shell beneath the surface of
a sphere in contrast to the amount needed to fill a shell around its centre † This is easier to conceptualise in three
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A criterion for model selection, defined as NQ(α̂) + 2K .
Bayesian Information Criterion
A criterion for model selection, defined as NQ(α̂) +N logK .
Chi-squared criterion
The chi-squared criterion is a loss function which measures the discrepency between a
candidate model and the data, NQ(α) = (z − ζ)T(z − ζ)
Construct
In context of simulation, the construct is the underlying function involved in the generation
of data.
Evidence
The evidence is the average over all possible parameter assignments for a given likelihood
and prior, and provides a measure as to how a well the model represents the data.
Identically and Independently Distributed
Samples or data which are independent and distributed according to the same distribution
Likelihood
The likelihood, p(z |α), is considered to be our model of data; it is a representation of the
data if it were to be parametrised according to α.
Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE)
Point which maximises the likelihood/minimises chi-squared.
Mean Squared Error (MSE)
Mean of the squared error over several trials.
Oracle estimate
TheOracle estimate is the theoretical best prediction when evaluating information criteria.
The Oracle evaluates criteria with the knowledge of the construct order against the model
order, i.e. C = K.
Order (model order)
The number of parameters in a model. Denoted by K for models and in the context of





The model of orderK , which is prescribed to the overaching radius
Overarching radius
The radius spanning between all models in spherically symmetric space.
Posterior
The posterior represents one’s inference about the parameters (or the model) and it is one’s
current state of knowledge in light of the data.
Prior
The prior, (α), The prior is our assignment of the parameters of our (likelihood) model. It
represents our conviction in the parameters without any consideration of the data.
Probability Density Function (PDF)
Probability distribution defined in continuous space.
Probability Mass Function (PMF)
Probability distribution defined in discrete space.
Radial scale
The scaling relation between the radiiRK of respective models and the overarching radius
r, represented by the parameter ℓ.
State of uncertainty




g-prior, 2, 43, 44, 46
r-likelihood, 46, 49, 52, 68
r-prior, 2, 50–52, 67
Central, 51, 52
Non-central, 51, 52
Additive noise, 23, 25, 28, 55, 56, 58
Akaike’s information criterion
AIC, 1, 6, 7, 39, 40, 65, 66
Bartlett’s Paradox, 44
Bayes factor, 35, 36, 38, 39, 44
Bayes’ rule, 7, 18, 34, 39
Bayesian information criterion
BIC, 1, 6, 7, 39, 40, 65, 66
Boolean algebra, 9, 11, 14
Candidate function/model, 1, 4, 20, 24, 26–
29, 31–33, 40, 52, 56, 58, 59, 62, 66,
68
Central limit theorem, 25
Chi-squared criterion, 1, 2, 25–27, 29, 39, 45,
46, 52, 54, 58, 67
Chu-Vandermonde convolution, 92
Construct, 56, 58, 59, 65, 66
Cox
Cox’s axioms, 82
Cox’s theorem, 83, 85
Data space, 28, 29, 45, 46
De Morgan’s law(s), 13, 14, 17
Deductive reasoning, 8, 14, 82
Desiderata, 15, 16, 70–73, 82, 83, 85
Discrete cosine transform, 55, 56
Discrete sine transform, 55, 56
Error
Statistical error, 3, 21, 22
Systematic error, 3, 21, 22, 55
Evidence, 1, 7, 18, 35–39, 41, 44, 49, 52, 53, 59
Central, 52, 53, 61, 63–66, 68




Hyper-g prior, 2, 44, 46, 65, 66






Logical independence, 17, 18
Inductive reasoning, 8, 9, 14, 82







Least squares, 5–7, 29, 31, 33, 67
Linear regression, 19, 24, 29, 31, 44, 53, 54, 67
Loss function
Mean squared error (MSE), 20, 60–65
Squared error, 59, 60
Maximum likelihood, 1, 6, 7, 25–27, 29, 31,
46, 63
Model comparison, 1, 2, 7, 36, 37, 39, 44, 51,
52, 67
Model space, 28, 29, 45, 46
Occam’s razor, 6, 7, 33, 37, 39
Oracle estimate, 59–65
Overarching model, 51, 61–65, 68
Overarching radius, 45, 46, 48–50
Parameter space, 2, 29, 46, 48




Principle of indifference, 42
Projection matrix, 29, 54
Propositional logic, 9, 10, 14–16, 67, 70, 71,
73, 86
Pseudo-inverse, 27, 29, 32, 54, 55
Rising factorial/power, xi, xii
Scale, 2, 44, 45
Radial scale, 44, 47, 61–65
Squared scale, 45, 46
Signal-to-noise ratio, 56–58, 62–67
Spherical symmetry, 1, 2, 31, 41, 42, 44, 46–
52, 67, 68, 104, 105
Uncertainty logic, 15, 16, 67, 70, 73, 83, 85
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“There is nothing noble in being superior to your fellow man; true nobility is being superior to
your former self.”
E. Hemingway
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